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With the advent of communication networks in robotic systems, distributed
networked robotic systems can be deployed to perform certain tasks collaboratively.
However, this makes the networked robotic systems vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Thus, the rigorous study of the impact of cyber attacks and the development of
corresponding defense mechanisms are necessary.
In this dissertation, the cyber-physical security issue of networked robotic sys-
tems is studied under a specific type of cyber attack called content modification
attack, which can modify the data content transmitted in the communication net-
works among the robots. Specifically, algorithms for attack design and detection
for content modification attacks are studied. The physics of the robotic system is
utilized to design and detect the cyber attacks for networked robotic systems.
Content modification attacks are studied for the synchronization problem in
networked robotic systems. The considered systems include multi-robot systems,
bilateral teleoperation systems and bilateral tele-driving systems. To demonstrate
the potential severity of the attack, a constructive methodology for attack design
is also developed. Specifically, a destabilizing content modification attack referred
to as a malignant content modification attack (MCoMA) is designed based on the
system storage function, which can lead to system instability and even physical
system damage. To protect the system, a physics-based attack detection scheme
with an encoding-decoding structure is proposed for general content modification
attacks. As part of the tele-driving system study, a novel passivity-based adaptive
bilateral tele-driving control scheme is also proposed in the presence of network
delays and dynamics parametric uncertainties. Simulations and experiments have
also been conducted to validate the proposed algorithms. This study demonstrates
the potential of utilizing the physics of the robotic system to better understand and
strengthen the security of the networked robotic systems.




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Associate Professor Nikhil Chopra, Chair/Advisor
Professor Balakumar Balachandran
Associate Professor Jin-Oh Hahn







I would like to acknowledge all the people who helped me in the process of
finishing this dissertation.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Nikhil Chopra
for the guidance and encouragement during all this time. This dissertation will
not be possible without your constant support. Special thanks to my labmate and
coauthor, Nirupam Gupta for all the discussions and collaborations during these
five years, and I really learn a lot. I would like to thank all my other labmates,
Prasad Chanekar, Gurtajbir Herr, Bryan Hays, Tianchen Liu and Jeffrey Twigg for
all the help and discussions towards this dissertation. I would also like to thank Dr.
Balakumar Balachandran, Dr. Jin-Oh Hahn, Dr. Derek Paley and Dr. Miao Yu
for being my dissertation committee members and providing the valuable advices
for this dissertation. Thanks to all the friends I met at the University of Maryland,
it is all of you that make this journey unique. Finally, I would especially like to
thank my parents for their unwavering support and thank my wife, Xin Xu for her




List of Tables v
List of Figures vi
List of Abbreviations viii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation and Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Bilateral Teleoperation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Multi-Robot System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 Bilateral Tele-Driving System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.4 Comparison of Three Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.5 Dynamics and Properties of Euler-Lagrange System . . . . . . 10
1.3 Related Works in Cyber-Physical Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 General Networked Control System Security . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Multi-Agent System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.3 Bilateral Teleoperation System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Contributions of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.6 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Overview of Attack Design and Detection Algorithms 20
2.1 Attack Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Attack Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Attack Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
iii
3 Content Modification Attacks on Bilateral Teleoperation System 31
3.1 Attack Design for BTOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.1 PD-like control scheme for BTOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.2 MCoMA Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Attack Detection for BTOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.1 Attack Detection on Static MCoMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.2 Attack Detection on General Content Modification Attack . . 48
3.3 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.1 MCoMA Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.2 Attack Detection on General Content Modification Attack . . 53
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4 Content Modification Attack on Multi-Robot System 60
4.1 Preliminary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1.1 Graph theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1.2 Existing synchronization protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2 Attack Design for MAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2.1 MCoMA Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.2 Optimal MCoMA Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Attack Detection/Mitigation for MAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.1 Attack Detection/Mitigation on Static MCoMA . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.1.1 Attack Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.1.2 Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.2 Attack Detection for General Content Modification Attack . . 80
4.4 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5 Content Modification Attacks on Bilateral Tele-Driving System 87
5.1 Bilateral Tele-driving Control Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2 Attack Design for Tele-driving System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.1 MCoMA on One Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.2 MCoMA on Both Sides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 Attack Detection for Tele-driving System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.1 Tele-driving Control Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.2 MCoMA Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4.3 Attack Detection on General Content Modification Attack . . 111
5.5 Tele-driving Experimental Platform Development . . . . . . . . . . . 112





1.1 Comparison of three networked robotic systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
v
List of Figures
1.1 General framework of a networked robotic system. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Application examples of BTOS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 A BTOS setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Multi-robot system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Multi-robot system can be modeled as a graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6 The sketch for tele-driving scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 General framework of a networked robotic system under cyber attacks. 21
2.2 An edge with nodes (m, s) in networked robotic system under attack. 23
3.1 The attacker can externally compromise the data content in commu-
nication network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding
structure for BTOS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 The PHANToM Omni haptic device. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 The BTOS experiment setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 The application architecture of the master robot for the MCoMA
experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 The storage function V under static MCoMA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.7 The checking error em on the slave side under a normal operation
condition in Case 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.8 The checking error em under a general content modification attack in
Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.9 The checking error rate emd under a general content modification
attack in Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.10 The checking error em on the slave side under a normal operation
condition in Case 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.11 The checking error em under a general content modification attack in
Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.12 The checking error rate emd under a general content modification
attack in Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
vi
4.1 Multi-agent system modeled by an undirected graph with agents as
the nodes and communication links as edges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 The relation between OMCoMA and MCoMA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 An instance of minimum edge cover for the graph in Fig. 4.1. . . . . . 75
4.4 Attack detection scheme for static MCoMA on edge (i, j). . . . . . . 77
4.5 Attack mitigation scheme for static MCoMA on edge (i, j). . . . . . . 79
4.6 Attack detection scheme for general content modification attack on
edge (m, s) for MAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.7 The position and velocity states of MAS under synchronization algo-
rithm (4.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8 The storage function V and storage function rate V̇ of MAS under
synchronization algorithm (4.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.9 The position and velocity states of MAS under OMCoMA. . . . . . . 84
4.10 The storage function V and the storage function rate V̇ of MAS under
OMCoMA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.11 The position and velocity states of MAS under OMCoMA with attack
detection/mitigation schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.12 The storage function V and rate V̇ of MAS under OMCoMA with
attack detection/mitigation schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1 The sketch for tele-driving scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2 The single track model of the car-like robot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 MCoMA on remote robot side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 Distributed MCoMA on both sides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.5 Physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding
structure for BTDS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6 The human input fh = [fh1, fh2] in the simulation. . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.7 The coordination performance of the proposed control scheme. . . . . 109
5.8 The coordination performance for t ∈ [3s, 9s]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.9 The trajectories of the parameters vector φ̂s for the remote robot. . . 110
5.10 Vs under MCoMA on remote robot side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.11 The attacker resides on the remote side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.12 Checking error ei and changing rate eid under a general content mod-
ification attack with attack detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113




BTOS Bilateral Teleoperation System
BTDS Bilateral Tele-driving System
DOF Degree-of-freedom
MAS Multi-agent System
MCoMA Malignant Content Modification Attack
OMCoMA Optimal Malignant Content Modification Attack
viii
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objective
In this dissertation, the cyber-physical security issue of networked robotic
systems is investigated. The networked robotic system refers to a robotic system
connected to a wired or wireless communication network. Cyber-physical security is
an emerging research field for cyber-physical systems (CPS) like networked robotic
systems [1–3]. Recent publicly known examples of cyber attacks on CPS include
Stuxnet malware sabotaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure [4] and the power trans-
mission network attack [5].
The traditional cyber security methods for information systems like cryptogra-
phy are not adequate for cyber-physical security and the necessity of cyber-physical
security study can be expounded as follows:
• Most of the CPS such as networked robotic systems are designed without
security considerations, and cyber attacks can directly impact or even damage
the critical physical system, so adequate safety nets are required.
• The CPS has real-time requirements and may additionally have energy con-
sumption/processing power constraints. Several modern cryptographic algo-
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rithms cannot be implemented in constrained devices and cannot satisfy the
real-time requirement as the algorithms were designed for desktop/server en-
vironments [6].
• The underlying physics of CPS can potentially be exploited to better under-
stand the attack impact and provide a different layer of security over existing
cyber security methods.
Based on these observations, the research objectives of this dissertation can
be summarized as follows:
A fundamental problem of synchronization is considered for the networked
robotic systems including bilateral teleoperation systems (BTOS), multi-robot sys-
tems, and bilateral tele-driving systems (BTDS). By utilizing the physics of robotic
systems, content modification attacks on synchronization of these systems are stud-
ied from two different perspectives:
• To better understand the severity of attack impact, the content modification
attack design is investigated from the attacker’s perspective.
• To effectively safeguard the system from content modification attack, the at-
tack detection scheme is investigated from the defender’s perspective.
The content modification attack is a cyber attack that can modify the data
content transmitted in the networks among the robots, and a formal definition is
given in Chapter 2.
In the rest of this chapter, three types of networked robotic systems are in-
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Figure 1.1: General framework of a networked robotic system.
are discussed and compared with the proposed work, the research results in the
dissertation are summarized, and finally the technical notations are introduced.
1.2 Background
Networked robotic systems can be divided into two types: (1) teleoperated,
where a human operator can send commands and receive feedback via the communi-
cation network; (2) autonomous, where robots exchange data via the communication
network allowing them to communicate with one another over long distances for co-
ordination without human’s involvement. A general framework of networked robotic
systems is shown in Fig. 1.1, which covers all three types of networked robotic sys-
tems in this dissertation. Considering the human in the loop scenario, the BTOS
and BTDS are introduced in Section 1.2.1 and 1.2.3. To address the case of only
autonomous robots, the multi-robot system is introduced in Section 1.2.2.
3
1.2.1 Bilateral Teleoperation System
BTOS can extend human capability to manipulate objects in remote environ-
ments with the help of robotic manipulators and communication networks. Such
systems can be used for various tasks, like handling hazardous materials [8], space
and underwater exploration [9,10], and telesurgery [11], etc. Two application exam-
ples of BTOS including an explosive ordnance disposal tele-robot and a tele-surgical
robot are shown in Fig. 1.2.
Typically, a BTOS consists of two robot manipulators termed the master and
slave robot. A human operator can teleoperate the remote slave robot to perform
certain tasks by manipulating the local master robot when two robots are coupled
and synchronized through a communication network. In Chapter 3 of this disserta-
tion, a BTOS setup as shown in Fig. 1.3 is considered. On being manipulated by
a human operator, the state of the master robot is transmitted to the slave robot
through a communication channel (wired or wireless). The slave robot is coupled
to the master robot state through an appropriate controller which then guides the
slave robot to complete a desired task in the remote environment. Simultaneously,
the state of the slave robot is communicated to the master robot, and through the
master controller a bilateral coupling is established between the two robots.
With the deployment of a communication network, the BTOS performance
suffers from the network effects including delays, noises, quantization errors and
packet drops. Numerous works have been conducted to overcome these issues and
they have yielded fairly successful results. The reader is referred to [12] and [13] for
4
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(a) The explosive ordnance disposal tele-robot by Cobham.
(b) The da Vinci telesurgery system by Intuitive Surgical. [7]
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Figure 1.3: A BTOS setup.
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robot network undirected and connected graph
Notations: Graph G = {V,E};  Node set V = {1,2,…,n};  Edge set E = {(i, j)∈V ×V | i, j adjacent}
Figure 1.5: Multi-robot system can be modeled as a graph.
an overview of BTOS control algorithms.
1.2.2 Multi-Robot System
The multi-robot system in Fig. 1.4 can be deployed in various tasks such as
surveillance, searching and mapping. Each robot can share the information with its
neighbors through communication links. One of the critical problems in distributed
cooperative control of multi-robot systems is called synchronization, which means
that multiple robots reach an agreement on a common value by interacting with
neighbors. The synchronization protocol can be applied in cases such as formation
control [14] and attitude alignment [15] for multi-robot systems.
As shown in Fig. 1.5, the multi-robot system can be abstracted as a multi-
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agent system (MAS) and modeled as a graph with agents as nodes and communi-
cation links as edges. The coupling of master and slave robots in BTOS can be
considered as a special case of MAS synchronization as two nodes in BTOS are
robot manipulators with nonlinear dynamics.
The agreement, consensus and synchronization problems for networked MAS
have been extensively studied by [16–30] amongst others, wherein different scenarios
such as directed/undirected graphs, fixed/switching topologies, network effects, de-
terministic/stochastic topologies, uncertainties/disturbances, and linear/nonlinear
dynamics are considered. In practice, a broad class of systems can be modeled by
a double integrators dynamics model, for example, certain vehicle dynamics can be
feedback linearized into double integrators. Thus, considerable research attention
has been paid to the consensus-related problem for MAS with double-integrator dy-
namics [31–35]. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, the synchronization problem of a
multi-robot system modeled as a MAS with double-integrator dynamics is consid-
ered.
The data transmission among agents also suffers from various network effects.
Over the past few decades, significant research effort has been accomplished to
address these issues [18,25,27,29] for consensus seeking MAS.
1.2.3 Bilateral Tele-Driving System
BTDS can allow a human driver to remotely operate a vehicle through wireless














Figure 1.6: The sketch for tele-driving scheme: qm1, qm2 are two joint
variables of joystick, β is the steering angle, ω is the angular velocity of
front wheel, v is the linear velocity of front wheel, Tmd, Tsd are constant
communication delays and rm, r̄s is the transmitted data defined later in
Chapter 5.
as discussed in [36], remote driving (tele-driving a real car) has many potential
applications such as transportation of goods, return of unoccupied vehicles, super-
vision and fail-safe operation of passenger or autonomous cars. The advantage of
tele-driving over fully-autonomous driving is to keep the human in the control loop
of the unmanned vehicle so as to handle the driving tasks in complex situations.
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, a BTDS for tele-driving a car-like mobile robot
is considered. Compared with the traditional bilateral teleoperation between two
robotic manipulators, one major difference for tele-driving a car-like mobile robot
is the kinematic dissimilarity between the local and remote robot. Fig. 1.6 displays
a BTDS, in which the human driver can use local two degree-of-freedom (DOF)
local robot (joystick) to tele-drive a car-like remote robot through a communication
network. This two DOF system can be analogously considered as steering wheel
and gas pedal inputs.
8
Considering previous work in control of bilateral tele-driving systems, the no-
tion of feedback r-passivity was proposed and utilized in [37] and [38] to study the
bilateral tele-driving scheme for a two-wheeled mobile robot. An impedance con-
trol framework was proposed for bilateral teleoperation of a car-like rover in [39].
In [40], a wave-variable method was applied on a kinematic model called extended
virtual-mass model for the car-like mobile robot teleoperation. In the previously
described algorithms, one DOF of the local device was used to control the remote
car’s linear velocity. In [39] and [40], the haptic feedback on the environmental force
was achieved for obstacle avoidance by defining a virtual environmental force based
on the relative distance and speeds between rover and obstacle. To better emulate
normal car driving, we utilize an additional DOF of the local robot as a gas/breaking
pedal for controlling the remote car’s acceleration, and to generate haptic feedback
when the remote car is in hard contact with an obstacle in the environment.
Thus in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, a new tele-driving scheme is proposed,
which achieves (qm1, β)-coordination and (qm2, ω̇)-coordination and provides haptic
feedback that can improve situation awareness of the local driver. Here (., .) implies
that these signals track each other asymptotically. Specifically, (qm1, β)-coordination
and (qm2, ω̇)-coordination imply that in the proposed control scheme, a local robot’s
link variables qm1, qm2 are used to control the steering angle β and angular acceler-
ation ω̇, respectively. It is worth noting that (qm2, ω̇)-coordination is equivalent to
(qm2, v̇)-coordination as v = rFω, where rF is the radius of the front wheel.
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1.2.4 Comparison of Three Systems
In this dissertation, the algorithms for content modification attack design and
detection are studied for three kinds of networked robotic systems, respectively. A
comparison of the three systems is given in the following table:
Table 1.1: Comparison of three networked robotic systems.
System Dynamics Topology Network Delay and Human
Parametric Uncertainty Operator
BTOS Nonlinear Two identical nodes No Yes
MAS Linear Multiple identical nodes No No
BTDS Nonlinear Two different nodes Yes Yes
BTOS and BTDS have two nodes in the system with nonlinear robotic dynam-
ics, and human operator is involved in the system. Here MAS is considered to have
multiple identical nodes in the system with a linear double-integrator dynamics,
and no human operator is involved in MAS. In BTOS, two nodes have the identical
dynamics, but two nodes in BTDS have different dynamics. Also, for BTDS, the
network delay and dynamic parametric uncertainty are considered in the study.
1.2.5 Dynamics and Properties of Euler-Lagrange System
In this dissertation, the robotic system can be modeled as an Euler-Lagrange
system with the following dynamics equation [64]:
M(q)q̈ + C(q, q̇)q̇ + g(q) = τ (1.1)
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where q ∈ Rn represents the generalized coordinates, M(q) is the inertial matrix,
C(q, q̇) is the centrifugal and Coriolis matrix, g(q) is the gravitational torque and τ
is the generalized force acting on the system.
Due to the dynamics structure, (1.1) have the following properties discussed
in [64], which are utilized later in this dissertation:
(P1.1) The inertia matrix M(q) is symmetric positive definite matrix, which
is lower and upper bounded by
λmIn ≤M(q) ≤ λMIn, (1.2)
where λm, λM are positive minimum and maximum eigenvalues of M(q) for all con-
figurations q.
(P1.2) Under an appropriate definition of C(q, q̇), the matrix Ṁ(q)−2C(q, q̇)
is skew symmetric.
(P1.3) The centrifugal and Coriolis term C(q, q̇)q̇ satisfies
|C(q, q̇)q̇| ≤ k0|q̇|2 (1.3)
for some k0 ∈ R+.
(P1.4) The dynamics are linearly parametrizable in the sense that
M(q)q̈ + C(q, q̇)q̇ + g(q) = Y (q, q̇, q̈)φ (1.4)
where Y (q, q̇, q̈) ∈ Rn×p is called regressor which is a matrix of known functions of
generalized coordinates and their derivatives, φ is called parameters vector which is
a constant p-dimensional vector of the inertia parameters (such as mass, moment of
inertia, etc.).
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1.3 Related Works in Cyber-Physical Security
In addition to the network effects discussed in the previous section that can
negatively affect the system performance, severe performance and safety degradation
can only occur due to cyber attacks. In this part, an introduction to the related
works in cyber-physical security study is given.
1.3.1 General Networked Control System Security
The study of cyber-physical security in networked control systems has been
conducted from two perspectives: (i) attack model and design; (ii) defense mecha-
nisms. For attack model and design, [41] defined a 3D attack space by the adver-
sary’s system knowledge, disclosure, and disruption resources. In [42], an optimal
control problem was studied under the denial-of-service attack where the attacker
denies data availability in the system. A replay attack was considered in [43], where
normal sensor readings can be recorded and repeated while implementing the at-
tack. Attack design and detection were studied for the LQG control problem. For
a similar LQG problem, a data injection attack was designed in [44]. In [45] an
undetected covert attack using full system knowledge was designed for both linear
and nonlinear networked control system. For defense mechanisms, [46] adopted a
quantitative risk management approach. A game theoretical method was studied
in [47], where a zero-sum differential game for robust control was coupled with a
zero-sum stochastic game for security policy. [48] designed a physical authentica-
tion scheme by watermarking the control input. For a linear descriptor system, [49]
12
defined attack detectability and identifiability, and constructed an observer-based
attack detection and identification monitor. Unlike the observer-based method, [50]
proposed an energy-based attack detection for passive networked CPS based on the
fact that the attack can affect the energy balance of the system.
1.3.2 Multi-Agent System Security
With the fact that MAS can be modeled as a graph with agents as nodes and
communication links as edges, the cyber attacks on MAS can be divided into two
categories: node attacks and edge attacks. In node attacks, the attacker can convert
normal nodes into malicious nodes, whereas in edge attacks, the attacker can break
the edge connections or modify the data in edges such as content modification at-
tacks. Some works in the literature have focused on node attacks and resilient MAS
design. In [51] and [52], the number of tolerable malicious nodes in the network
was characterized by the notion of network connectivity and network robustness,
respectively. [53] studied the robustness of consensus tracking under an edge attack
called connectivity-broken attack. Other works studied the attack detection and
identification methods. An observer-based malicious node detection and identifica-
tion scheme for first order MAS consensus was proposed in [54]. An unknown input
observer-based distributed faulty node and edge detection and isolation scheme for
second order MAS consensus was studied in [55].
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1.3.3 Bilateral Teleoperation System Security
The security of BTOS has attracted recent attention from the research com-
munity since the attacker has the potential to cause harm to the robots, humans and
the environment involved, which is highly undesired in any bilateral teleoperation
application. The security threats in surgical telerobotics were identified by [56], and
an experimental analysis of security threats on the RAVEN surgical robot was pre-
sented in [57]. However, no rigorous theoretical analysis of the attack strategies and
the prevention/mitigation solutions were discussed. Also it is worth noting that [57]
studied a so-called “Surgeon’s Intent Modification” attack, which only modifies the
data packet from surgeon to surgical robot. The content modification attacks dis-
cussed in this dissertation is one kind of “man-in-the-middle-attack” known as “Mes-
sage modification and spoofing attack” discussed in [56]. This kind of attack can
first block the communication between master and slave, and connect independently
with both sides, then forward the modified malicious message to both sides. Other
works include secure communication protocol design for telesurgery [58] [59], how-
ever a theoretical analysis of the attacks has not been considered in this study.
1.4 Contributions of the Dissertation
Compared with the aforementioned works, this dissertation has the following
contributions:
For networked robotic systems including BTOS, MAS and BTDS
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• In order to better demonstrate the severe attack impact, different from the
works [53, 55] considering edge attacks, a systematic framework for design-
ing destabilizing malignant content modification attacks (termed MCoMA) is
developed based on the notion of physical storage function.
• To safeguard the system, a physics-based attack detection scheme with an
encoding-decoding structure is proposed for general content modification at-
tacks, which can be arbitrary modifications on data content. Compared with
the detection schemes in the aforementioned works, (i) [49, 50, 54, 55] con-
sider linear system dynamics, whereas the tele-robotic systems with nonlinear
robotic dynamics are considered in Chapter 3 and 5, thus their detection
schemes on linear systems cannot be directly applied; (ii) The observer-based
detection schemes [49, 54, 55] and the energy-based detection scheme [50] re-
quire the system model and are prone to high computation and communication
costs. In contrast, the proposed attack detection scheme does not require the
detailed knowledge of system parameters and is solely based on the inherent
physical relation within the transmitted data: once the data content is cor-
rupted, the inherent physical relation is violated, allowing the attack to be
detected, thus it is fast-response, distributed, computationally light and can
detect general content modification attacks (including MCoMA as a special
case).
• As part of the research results on BTDS in Chapter 5, a passivity-based adap-
tive bilateral tele-driving control scheme is proposed in the presence of com-
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munication delays and dynamic parametric uncertainties. (i) Different from
previous works [37–40], the proposed scheme can achieve a new control mode
for tele-driving, which is the position-acceleration (qm2, ω̇) coordination as de-
scribed in Section 1.2.3; (ii) Inspired by the formulation in [60], the proposed
algorithm avoids the typically assumed passivity assumption on the human and
the environment. It should be noted that the control algorithms in [13,61,62]
can be analogously modified to to make them more broadly applicable.
1.5 Organization
The main results of the dissertation are organized as follows:
• Overview of Attack Design and Detection Algorithms (Chapter 2):
In this chapter, an overview of attack design and detection algorithms is given.
A formal modeling of the attacker is first presented. The design idea of the
MCoMA is then described. Based on a simple physics-based detection con-
dition, an attack detection algorithm called physics-based attack detection
scheme with an encoding-decoding structure is proposed to detect any gen-
eral content modification attack, which can be arbitrary modification on the
original data content.
• Content Modification Attack on BTOS (Chapter 3): Based on the
algorithms proposed in Chapter 2, content modification attacks on BTOS are
studied, where the attacker can modify the states being exchanged between
the master and the slave robot. To demonstrate the damaging attack impact,
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a static MCoMA is designed, where the modified state is in the static state
feedback form of the original state. The simple physics-based detection con-
dition is utilized for detecting MCoMA on BTOS. To protect the system, the
physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding structure
is applied for detecting any general content modification attack. A BTOS
experiment platform consisting of two PHANToM Omni robots is developed.
The efficacy of the proposed attacks design and detection algorithms is studied
through experiments.
• Content Modification Attack on MAS (Chapter 4): Following a similar
approach for BTOS, to demonstrate the severe attack impact on second order
MAS synchronization, a static MCoMA is first designed. Since multiple links
among MAS can be attacked, an optimal MCoMA that is distributed and
compromises the least number of links is also designed. The same physics-
based attack detection condition is applied for detecting static MCoMA. The
physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding structure is
also applied to protect against general content modification attacks. Addition-
ally, a velocity observer-based attack mitigation scheme is also discussed for
MCoMA. The efficacy of the proposed results is illustrated through numerical
simulations.
• Content Modification Attack on BTDS (Chapter 5): A passivity-based
adaptive bilateral tele-driving control scheme is first proposed that enables a
human operator to tele-drive a car-like mobile robot with haptic feedback in
17
the presence of communication delays and dynamic parametric uncertainties.
The static MCoMA is designed for the proposed tele-driving system. The
physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding structure is
adopted for detecting general content modification attacks on the tele-driving
system. MCoMA design and attack detection scheme are verified through
various simulations. An initial BTDS experimental platform is also developed.
1.6 Notations
Throughout the dissertation, the symbols Z, Rn, Rn×m, R+0 and R+ denote the
sets of positive integers, n-dimensional real-valued vectors, n by m matrices with
real-valued elements, sets of nonnegative and positive real numbers, respectively. |·|
denotes the Euclidean norm for a vector and denotes the cardinality of a set. || · ||0
denotes the l0 norm that is a total number of non-zero elements in a vector. In,
0n, 0n and 1n denotes n by n identity matrix, n by n zero matrix, n-dimensional
column vector of zeros and n-dimensional column vector of ones, respectively. For
any matrix A ∈ Rn×n, A  0 denotes it’s positive definite, A  0 denotes it’s
positive semidefinite, AT denotes its transpose, A− denotes generalized inverse, if
A is invertible then A−1 denotes its inverse and Ai represents its i-th column. diag
denotes the diagonal matrix. ⊗ denotes Kronecker product. N (·) denotes the
null space of a matrix. dim(·) denotes the dimension of matrix or space. For any
function f : R+0 → Rn, the L∞-norm is defined as ‖f‖∞ = supt≥0|f(t)|, and L2-
norm is defined as ‖f‖2 = (
∫∞
0
|f(t)|2dt)1/2. The L∞ and L2 spaces are defined as
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the set {f : ‖f‖∞ <∞} and {f : ‖f‖2 <∞}, respectively.
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Chapter 2: Overview of Attack Design and Detection Algorithms
In this chapter, an overview of attack design and detection algorithms is given.
A formal modeling of the attacker is first presented in Section 2.1. Then the de-
sign idea of the MCoMA is described in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, based on
a simple physics-based detection condition, an attack detection algorithm called
physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding structure is pro-
posed to detect any general content modification attack, which can be an arbitrary
modification on the original data content.
2.1 Attack Modeling
As shown in Fig. 2.1, two types of cyber attacks can be defined based on the
graph structure for networked robotic systems:
• Node attack: an attacker can convert a normal node to a malicious node.
• Edge attack: an attacker can break edge connections or modify information
in edges.
In this dissertation, we are specifically interested in one kind of edge attack











Figure 2.1: General framework of a networked robotic system under cyber attacks.
in communication links.
In this dissertation, the assumptions hold for the attacker.:
(A2.1) Attacker has the knowledge of system dynamics structure, controller
structure and controller gains except a set of state initial values (made clear in the
sequel).
(A2.2) Attacker has the ability to receive, interpret, manipulate and forward
the data between any pair of robots.
In addition, a formal model for the attacker is provided next.
Definition 2.1.1. The attacker is a malicious external entity with assumptions
(A2.1)-(A2.2) which can launch an edge attack called content modification attack
by modifying original data d ∈ Rp to modified data d̃ ∈ Rp as the following mapping
g:
g : Rp → Rp, d 7→ d̃. (2.1)
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In fact, d̃ ∈ Rp can always be expressed as
d̃ = d+ d̂, (2.2)
where d̂ ∈ Rp is referred to as injection data in this dissertation. In this dissertation,
the attack as described by (2.1) and (2.2) is termed as a general content modification
attack.
2.2 Attack Design
To demonstrate the severe impact of content modification attack, from the
attacker’s perspective, a special content modification attack called malignant content
modification attack (MCoMA) is designed, which results in an unbounded growth of
a physical storage function thus causing system instability and even physical system
damage. The formal definition of MCoMA can be given as:
Definition 2.2.1. A content modification attack that modifies the data content
transmitted in communication links and ensures that a positive semidefinite system
storage function V satisfies limt→∞ V =∞ with V̇ ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ ta ≥ 0 (ta is the attack
launch time) is called the malignant content modification attack (MCoMA) with
respect to storage function V .
Typically, the physical storage function V can be interpreted as the synchro-
nization metric for the system. When V keeps decreasing, the synchronization can
be achieved, however, if the content modification attack is designed such that V




(zs , !zs )(zs , !"zs )
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Figure 2.2: An edge with nodes (m, s) in networked robotic system under attack.
damage to the system. Hence, in this dissertation, following the above definition, we
will design a static MCoMA for three kinds of networked robotic systems, respec-
tively, where the injection data of attacker is in a static feedback form of the original
data. The design procedure for each system is detailed in the following chapters.
2.3 Attack Detection
To establish a general framework for the proposed attack detection algorithms,
let us consider an edge in the networked robotic system as shown in Fig. 2.1, in which
two nodes (m, s) exchange their states information through the network. As shown
in Fig. 2.2, two nodes transmit their states (zi, żi), i = m, s in the network, and the
attacker defined in Definition 2.1.1 can modify the data into (z̃i, ˜̇zi), i = m, s.
Utilizing the physics of the robotic system, a simple physics-based detection
condition can be used to detect the content modification attack. This condition
checks if the physical relationship between the received data ˜̇zi and z̃i is violated
under the attack. To be specific, the received data (z̃i, ˜̇zi) is only accepted when the
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However, the simple detection condition (2.3) is not always adequate for pro-
tecting the system, because it is easy for the attacker to design the injection data
(ẑi, ˆ̇zi) for (zi, żi) such that the detection condition (2.3) is satisfied, which means
the detection is bypassed.
Thus, an attack detection algorithm called physics-based attack detection
scheme with an encoding-decoding structure is proposed for any general content
modification attack defined as (2.1) and (2.2) (including MCoMA as a special case).
The main motivation for designing this encoding-decoding structure is to guaran-
tee that once the encoded data is modified by attacker, the physical relationship
between the decoded data must be violated, and hence the attack is detected.
In practice, the scheme is implemented in discrete time. For i = m, s, let Ti
denote the sufficiently small sampling period for two nodes. On each side, the data
is transmitted at the time instance t = {kiTi|ki = 1, 2, 3...}, where ki ∈ Z is the
transmission sequence number.
In the rest of the dissertation, for the notation such as iλkiia, the superscript
ki denotes the sequence number ki, and the upper left i denotes the transmission
direction. In the proposed encoding-decoding scheme, for i = m or s and j = s or
m, a set of encoding factors iλia,
iλib ∈ R and decoding factors iλja, iλjb ∈ R are
utilized. For each transmission sequence ki, the encoding and decoding factors are
24













iλki−1jb , ki) (2.5)
where functions fa, fb : R × Z → R are known to both sides and fa, fb need to be
designed such that iλkija 6=
iλkijb.





= żkii . (2.6)
If the initial values for (iλia,
iλib) and (
iλja,












iλkib . Recall that in assumption (A1.1), it is
assumed that the attacker does have the knowledge of a set of state initial values. To
be specific here, we assume the initial values iλ0a,
iλ0b , z
0
i are unknown to the attacker.
In other words, for the proposed detection scheme to succeed, we assume:
(A2.3) For i = m or s, the initial values for the encoding/decoding factors
(iλ0a,
iλ0b) and state z
0
i can be shared securely between both nodes before the opera-
tion starts.1
If iλ0a,
iλ0b are unknown to attacker, then the attacker does not know the value
of iλkia ,
iλkib during the operation. If z
0
i is unknown to attacker, then the detection
1It can be argued that the attacker may deduce the initial values using an observer-based
approach. Initial investigation to mitigate this possibility has been accomplished in [63].
25
condition (2.6) can be checked when both sides start to sending the data packet
from ki = 1.
Next, the implementation of the proposed attach detection scheme with an
encoding-decoding structure is outlined.
For each transmission sequence ki = 1, 2, 3, ...
1. On the sending end i = m or s, first update the encoding factors iλia,
iλib as
(2.4). Then instead of sending (żkii , z
ki





















2. On the receiving end j = s or m, after receiving the data, first update the
decoding factors iλja,























Note iaki , ibki , icki are only valid when iλkija 6=
iλkijb.
3. After decoding, check the physical relationship between zkii and ż
ki
i using (2.6).
4. If the detection condition (2.6) is not violated, utilize żkii , z
ki
i on the receiving
end. Otherwise, the attack is detected, and reject the received data to protect
the system.
The following theorem gives a necessary condition that a general content modifica-
tion attack can avoid the detection.
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Theorem 2.3.1. With the proposed attack detection scheme, suppose a general
content modification attack is launched at transmission sequence kai and for ki ≥ kai ,
the attacker can modify (rkiia , r
ki
















where r̂kiia , r̂
ki
ib are arbitrary injection data. Then the above content modification
attack can avoid the proposed detection scheme only if






where Ti is the sufficiently small sampling period for i = m, s.
Proof:







ibki r̃kiia − icki r̃
ki
ib , (2.10)
Executing the detection condition (2.6) for z̃kii and ˜̇z
ki
i from (2.10), using (2.8), and

























ibki r̂kiia − icki r̂
ki
ib . (2.12)
Assume the attacker can avoid the detection condition (2.6), which means (z̃kii −
z̃ki−1i )/Ti = ˜̇z
ki














which is equivalent to






Hence, the content modification attack (2.9) can avoid the detection only if (2.14)
is satisfied.

Condition (2.14) represents a complex relation between two consecutive injec-
tion data. When iλkia and
iλkib are unknown to the attacker during the operation,
the condition (2.14) cannot be satisfied, and thus the attack can be detected. The
following corollary provides a simpler sufficient condition for the attack detection.
Corollary 2.3.1. With the proposed attack detection scheme, suppose the attack
(2.9) is launched at transmission sequence kai . The general content modification

















iλkib are the encoding and decoding factors.
Proof:
The content modification attack (2.9) is launched at ki = k
a
i ≥ 1, then the data
content before ki = k
a




i2 equal 0n in condition
(2.14) at ki = k
a
i .
Hence at ki = k
a






























iλkijb are unknown to the attacker during the operation, the content





Remark 2.3.1. As described in the detection scheme, the scheme is solely based on
the data between two consecutive sequences ki and ki−1. Here the detection scheme
is presented in a discrete time setting, which is more realistic in implementation,
and the encoding and decoding factors are updated asynchronously once the packet
is sent or received as (2.4) and (2.5). Consequently, current scheme is independent
of the network delay. Due to other network factors such as noises and quantization






− żkii | < εi, (2.16)
where ei is termed checking error and the constant threshold εi > 0 can be de-
termined empirically. Since there exists a sudden jump in ei when an attack is
launched, there is a sharp spike in the trajectory of ei’s derivative at the attack
time points. Thus, we can have another attack detection condition based on ei’s






| > σi, (2.17)
where σi is a large enough positive number, then the attack is detected. The detec-
tion condition (2.17) can be used as an additional indication on the attack.
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Remark 2.3.2. Unlike the model-based attack detection schemes in [49, 50, 54,
55], the proposed attack detection scheme is solely based on the inherent physical
relation within the transmitted data and does not require the knowledge of the
system parameters. The detection condition is easy to compute and only relies
on two consecutive data samples. Thus, the proposed detection scheme has the
following advantages: it is fast, distributed, computationally light, and does not
require knowledge of system parameters.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, a formal attack modeling is first given for this dissertation.
Then the design idea of MCoMA is presented, and the specific design procedure will
be explained in the following chapters. Considering two nodes exchanging states
data in an edge of networked robotic system, a physics-based attack detection scheme
with an encoding-decoding structure is proposed for general content modification
attacks, which will be applied respectively for the three kinds of networked robotic
systems in the rest of the dissertation. The proposed attack detection algorithm
can also potentially be applied for detecting general content modification attacks in
a variety of networked control/robotic systems.
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Chapter 3: Content Modification Attacks on Bilateral Teleoperation
System
In this chapter, the content modification attack on BTOS synchronization
shown in Fig. 3.1 is studied. The master and slave robotic manipulators ex-
change their states (joint position and velocity) through a communication network
to achieve the BTOS synchronization. As discussed in Chapter 1, the BTOS syn-
chronization can be viewed as a special case of MAS synchronization, only in this
case (i) two nodes with nonlinear manipulator dynamics are considered and (ii) in-
teractions with human/environment are involved in the system. The BTOS suffers
from the attacker defined in Definition 2.1.1, who can launch content modification
attacks to modify the content of the transmitted data. The attack on BTOS has
potentials to cause harm to the robots, the human and the environment involved,
which is highly undesired in any bilateral teleoperation application.
The results of this chapter can be summarized as follows: Based on the algo-
rithms proposed in Chapter 2, content modification attacks on BTOS are studied,
where the attacker can modify the states being exchanged between the master and
the slave robot. To demonstrate the damaging attack impact, a static MCoMA is de-


















Figure 3.1: The attacker can externally compromise the data content in
communication network.
state. The simple physics-based detection condition is utilized for detecting MCoMA
on BTOS. To protect the system, the physics-based attack detection scheme with
an encoding-decoding structure is applied for detecting any general content modi-
fication attack. A BTOS experiment platform consisting of two PHANToM Omni
robots is developed. The efficacy of the proposed attacks design and detection al-
gorithms is studied through experiments.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, the attack design
is discussed for a PD-like BTOS control scheme. In Section 3.1.1, a PD-like BTOS
control scheme is first introduced as a simple case for the attack design. Then in
Section 3.1.2, the MCoMA design is described in the context of BTOS. In Section 3.2,
the attack detection scheme for content modification attacks is discussed. Finally,
the experiment results are presented in Section 3.3.
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3.1 Attack Design for BTOS
In this section, to demonstrate the potential of a severe attack, a special con-
tent modification attack called MCoMA is designed for a simple PD-like BTOS
control scheme based on Section 2.2. The MCoMA can result in an unbounded
growth of a physical storage function, thereby causing system instability and even
physical system damage.
3.1.1 PD-like control scheme for BTOS
Consider a BTOS consisting of a pair of nonlinear revolute robotic manipula-
tors coupled via a communication network, as shown in Fig. 3.1. Ignoring external
disturbances and friction, given Section 1.2.5, the dynamics of n-link master and
slave robots are given as
Mm(qm)q̈m + Cm(qm, q̇m)q̇m +Gm(qm) = τh + τm,
Ms(qs)q̈s + Cs(qs, q̇s)q̇s +Gs(qs) = τs − τe, (3.1)
where subscript i = m, s denotes the master and slave robot, respectively. Hence-
forth, subscript i will represent both master and slave robots. Here, q̈i, q̇i, qi ∈ Rn
are the angular acceleration, velocity and position, respectively, Mi(qi) ∈ Rn×n is the
inertia matrix, Ci(qi, q̇i) ∈ Rn×n is the centrifugal and Coriolis matrix, Gi(qi) ∈ Rn
is the gravitational torque, τi ∈ Rn is the robot control input, and τh, τe ∈ Rn are
torques exerted by the human operator and the environment, respectively.
In this section, to simplify the theoretical analysis of the attack design, the
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following assumptions are made for the BTOS:
(A3.1) The network condition is perfect, which means the network effects
such as time delays, data losses are not considered in the attack design.










T τe(s)ds ≥ −βe (3.2)
for t > 0 and some βh, βe ∈ R+0 .
(A3.3) The gravitational forces are pre-compensated such that,
τm = um +Gm(qm), τs = us +Gs(qs) (3.3)
in the given dynamics (3.1). This reduces the overall dynamics of the BTOS as
Mm(qm)q̈m + Cm(qm, q̇m)q̇m = τh + um,
Ms(qs)q̈s + Cs(qs, q̇s)q̇s = us − τe. (3.4)
The control structure is shown in Fig. 3.1, the data consisting of velocity and
position as (q̇Ti , q
T
i )
T is transmitted between the two robots, the received data is




Proposition 3.1.1. Assume (A3.1)-(A3.3) hold and the data-transmission through
the communication link is perfect (˜̇qi = q̇i, q̃i = qi). Consider the BTOS dynamics
given in (3.4) controlled by a PD-like controller:
um = −Kd(q̇m − ˜̇qs)−Kp(qm − q̃s)−Kdmq̇m,
us = −Kd(q̇s − ˜̇qm)−Kp(qs − q̃m)−Kdmq̇s, (3.5)
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where Kd, Kp, Kdm ∈ R+. Then,
(a) The position error eq := qs−qm is bounded, and velocity error ėq := q̇s− q̇m
asymptotically converges to zero, limt→∞ ėq = 0n.
(b) In the free motion case (τh = τe = 0n), the states get synchronized,
limt→∞ eq = limt→∞ ėq = 0n.
(c) If q̇i = q̈i = 0n, the environment contact force is accurately transmitted
back to the human operator, τh = τe.
It should be noted that Proposition 3.1.1 does not constitute the main
results of this chapter, but here a proof is given just for completeness. The proof
idea is similar to proof of Theorem 3.5 in [13] and Proposition 2 in [65]. Before the
proof is given, we also need to state the following Barbalat’s lemma [66]:
Lemma 3.1.1. The Barbalat’s lemma can be stated in following two equivalent
forms:
(a) If function f(t) ∈ L2 and ḟ is bounded, then f → 0 as t→∞.
(b) If function f(t) has a finite limit as t → ∞ and if ḟ is uniformly continuous
(f̈ ∈ L∞), then ḟ → 0 as t→∞.
Now the proof of Proposition 3.1.1 can be given:










(qs − qm)TKp(qs − qm)−
∫ t
0
q̇Tmτh + βh +
∫ t
0
q̇Ts τe + βe
(3.6)
The property (P1.1) and assumption (A3.2) can guarantee the positive semidefi-
niteness of V . The derivative of V along the system trajectories described by (3.4)
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and (3.5) with the property (P1.2) is given by
V̇ = −q̇Ts Kdmq̇s − q̇TmKdmq̇m − q̇Ts (Kd(q̇s − ¯̇qm) +Kp(qs − q̃m))− q̇Tm(Kd(q̇m − ¯̇qs)
(3.7)
+Kp(qm − q̃s)) + (q̇s − q̇m)TKp(qs − qm)
If transmission is perfect (¯̇qi = q̇i, q̃i = qi), then
V̇ = −q̇Ts Kdmq̇s − q̇TmKdmq̇m − (q̇s − q̇m)TKd(q̇s − q̇m)
= −Kdm|q̇m|2 −Kdm|q̇s|2 −Kd|ėq|2. (3.8)
Since V̇ is negative semi-definite, limt→∞ V is finite, thus q̇s, q̇m, qs−qm are bounded.
Integrating V̇ from 0 to t, we get




Thus, q̇m, q̇s, ėq ∈ L2.
From (3.4), we have
q̈m = Mm(qm)
−1(−C(qm, q̇m)q̇m + τh + um)
q̈s = Ms(qs)
−1(−C(qs, q̇s)q̇s + τe + us) (3.10)
We can find q̈m, q̈s are also bounded. Invoking Barbalat’s lemma (a), we can see
q̇m, q̇s, ėq → 0 as t→∞. This completes the proof of part (a).
Consider the free motion case, differentiating q̈m and using property (P1.1)
and (P1.3), one can show
...
q m ∈ L∞, thus q̈m is uniformly continuous. Invoking
Barbalat’s lemma (b), since q̇m has a finite limit as t → ∞ and q̈m is uniformly
continuous, then q̈m → 0 as t→∞.
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Now consider the dynamic (3.10) again, then we can find eq = qs − qm → 0 as
t→∞. This completes the proof of part (b).
Additionally, in the static case (q̇i = q̈i = 0), from dynamic (3.4), we can see
τh = Kp(qm − qs) = τe, which completes the proof of part (c).

Remark 3.1.2. Since the essential goal of Section 3.1 is to demonstrate a con-
structive methodology for attack design, assumptions (A3.1)-(A3.3) are required
so that a PD-like BTOS control scheme can be considered for the theoretical attack
design. Attack design for other advanced BTOS control architectures can be simi-
larly accomplished and assumptions specific to the chosen architecture would then
replace (A3.1)-(A3.3). The network assumption (A3.1) is used in the current sec-
tion to simplify the theoretical attack design. It is not assumed in the experiments
of Section 3.3, and it is also not explicitly required in the attack detection scheme
in Section 3.2. The consequences of realistic network effects for implementing the
proposed detection scheme are discussed in Remark 2.3.1.
3.1.2 MCoMA Design
In this subsection, the MCoMA design for BTOS is discussed following the
design idea in Section 2.2. Based on Definition 2.1.1, for the BTOS with a PD-like
control scheme in Fig. 3.1, the attacker can launch a content modification attack
by modifying the data content (q̇Ti , q
T
i )
T being exchanged by the master and slave
robots and intelligently replace them with (˜̇qTi , q̃
T
i )
T for i = m, s.
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Besides the assumptions made in Section 2.1, an additional assumption is made
for the attacker:
(A3.4) The attack starts at t = ta ≥ 0, assume q(ta) /∈ E, where
E ={q := (q̇Ts , qTs , q̇Tm, qTm)T |q̇s = q̇m = 0n, qs = qm}. (3.11)
is the equilibrium set for BTOS.
In this subsection, based on Definition 2.2.1, the MCoMA with respect to
storage function (3.6) is studied for BTOS. The storage function (3.6) can be used as
a Lyapunov-like function for the system (3.4) to demonstrate master slave synchro-
nization in the system. In other words, (3.6) can be viewed as a metric for BTOS
synchronization. Clearly, MCoMA can not only prevent the BTOS synchronization
but also lead to violent instability in the overall system. V is positive semidefinite
due to the property (P1.1) and assumption (A3.2). An increasing V implies that
controllers can eventually drive the motors of the revolute robotic manipulators to
their maximum speed limits for an indefinite amount of time. This can put stress on
the mechanical system of the robots, thereby making the BTOS unsafe for human
users and the environment. Hence, it is essential to study the impact of such con-
tent modification attacks. To be noted, it is not always necessary for the attacker
to launch MCoMA if the attacker’s goal is just to disrupt the system, but here the
MCoMA can be considered as the worst case design from the system’s perspective
in terms of the physical storage function and can be used to justify the potentially
damaging impact of the content modification attack. The detection scheme for
general content modification attacks is discussed in Section 3.2.
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Specifically, a type of MCoMA called static MCoMA is proposed for the BTOS,
where the injection data is in static feedback form of the original data.
Theorem 3.1.1. Consider BTOS dynamics (3.4) controlled by (3.5). A content
modification attack, which modifies the states being exchanged between the master
and the slave robot as
q̃ = q + q̂ = q +Kq, (3.12)






















T and ‘attack gain’ constant K ∈ R4n×4n, is a MCoMA
with respect to storage function V in (3.6) if and only if
(a) P := A+BK is positive semidefinite;
(b) the set S\E is not positively invariant, where S := {q ∈ R4n|qTPq = 0},
A =

−(Kdm +Kd)In 0n KdIn 0n
0n 0n 0n 0n
KdIn 0n −(Kdm +Kd)In 0n




0n 0n KdIn KpIn
0n 0n 0n 0n
KdIn KpIn 0n 0n




Consider the storage function given in (3.6) for the BTOS. Clearly, V > 0,∀q ∈
R4n\E.
Using property (P1.1), the derivative of V along the system trajectories de-
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q̇Ts Ṁsq̇s + q̇
T





m(−Cmq̇m + um) + (q̇s − q̇m)TKp(qs − qm).
(3.13)
Using property (P1.2),
V̇ = q̇Ts us + q̇
T
mum + (q̇s − q̇m)TKp(qs − qm) = −q̇Ts Kdmq̇s − q̇TmKdmq̇m − q̇Ts (Kd(q̇s − ˜̇qm)
+Kp(qs − q̃m))− q̇Tm(Kd(q̇m − ˜̇qs) +Kp(qm − q̃s)) + (q̇s − q̇m)TKp(qs − qm).
(3.14)
Substituting q̃ from (3.12) into (3.14) gives
V̇ = qT (A+BK)q = qTPq. (3.15)
Sufficiency:
From (A3.4), q(ta) /∈ E, which means V (ta) is positive. Using (3.15), the
following conclusions can be made:
(a) if P is positive semidefinite, then V always stays positive ∀t ≥ ta and q never
enters E.
(b) if the set S\E is not positively invariant, then V̇ cannot always stay in 0, thus
the V ultimately keeps increasing.
Hence from Definition 2.2.1, a content modification attack given by (3.12) is
MCoMA with respect to storage function V in (3.6).
Necessity:
By Definition 2.2.1, if the content modification attack is MCoMA with re-
spect to storage function V in (3.6), then V̇ ≥ 0 in (3.15), which implies P is
40
positive semidefinite. Further, V → ∞ as t → ∞, implies the set S\E should not
be positively invariant. Hence, both (a) and (b) are necessary.

As the ‘attack gain’ K is a constant matrix, the content modification attack
(3.12) is referred to as static MCoMA.
Remark 3.1.3. Among different choices for the attacker to modify the content, the
proposed MCoMA (3.12) guarantees the increase of the storage function V (given
by (3.6)) and also gives a provision for controlling the degree of instability in the
BTOS by adjusting V̇ (given by (3.15)), and this point will be further demonstrated
in the sequel.
The following proposition discusses a simple MCoMA design method with the
help of Theorem 3.1.1.
Proposition 3.1.4. Consider BTOS dynamics (3.4) controlled by (3.5). A content
modification attack that modifies the states being exchanged between the master
and slave robots in the form given by (3.12) is a MCoMA with respect to storage
function V in (3.6), if the ‘attack gain’
K =

K11 K12 K13 + Λ3 K14
K21 K22 K23 + Λ4 K24
K31 + Λ1 K32 K33 K34




where Kij ∈ Rn×n are constant coefficient matrices satisfying
−(Kd +Kdm)In +KdK31 +KpK41 = 0n
−(Kd +Kdm)In +KdK13 +KpK23 = 0n
KdIn +KdK11 +KpK21 = 0n
KdIn +KdK33 +KpK43 = 0n
KdK32 +KpK42 = 0n, KdK12 +KpK22 = 0n
KdK34 +KpK44 = 0n, KdK14 +KpK24 = 0n
(3.16)
and {Λj} ∈ Rn×n are positive definite matrices.
Proof:
Consider the storage function V given by (3.6) and from (3.15), V̇ = qT (A +
BK)q.
Let K = K∗ + K̂, where
K∗ =

K11 K12 K13 K14
K21 K22 K23 K24
K31 K32 K33 K34




0n 0n Λ3 0n
0n 0n Λ4 0n
Λ1 0n 0n 0n
Λ2 0n 0n 0n

.
Substituting K into V̇ gives
V̇ = qT (A+BK∗)q + qTBK̂q. (3.17)
42
Using (3.16) in (3.17) gives
V̇ = qTBK̂q
= q̇Ts KdΛ1q̇s + q̇
T





It is obvious that V̇ is positive semidefinite, which implies the condition (a) in
Theorem 3.1.1 is satisfied.
In this case, S = {q ∈ R4n|q̇s = q̇m = 0n} (refer to condition (b) in Theorem
3.1.1), thus S\E = {q ∈ R4n|q̇s = q̇m = 0n, qs 6= qm}.
With q̃ = q +Kq, the controller (3.5) becomes
um = (KdΛ3 +KpΛ4)q̇m −Kp(qm − qs),
us = (KdΛ1 +KpΛ2)q̇s −Kp(qs − qm). (3.19)
When q̇s and q̇m are 0n, the nonzero |qm − qs| term in control can drive the
state away from zero thereby rendering the velocities nonzero. Thus, S\E is not
positively invariant set, which satisfies condition (b) of Theorem 3.1.1.
Hence, the content modification attack given in the proposition is MCoMA
with respect to storage function V in (3.6).

As it is mentioned in Remark 3.1.3, V̇ can be adjusted by appropriately
selecting {Λj}.
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3.2 Attack Detection for BTOS
The detection algorithms proposed in Section 2.3 can be applied here to detect
the content modification attacks on BTOS by replacing the notation (żi, zi) in Sec-
tion 2.3 with (q̇i, qi) here. In this section, the simple physics-based detection condi-
tion discussed in Section 2.3 is first applied to detect the static MCoMA proposed in
Section 3.1.2. Then the physics-based detection scheme with an encoding-decoding
structure proposed in Section 2.3 is adopted for general content modification attacks
on BTOS.
3.2.1 Attack Detection on Static MCoMA
For detecting the static MCoMA proposed in Section 3.1.2, the simple physics-
based detection condition (2.3) can be executed on both receiving ends, where the
inherent physical relation between constituents of the transmitted data is checked.
To be specific in this case, the received data (q̃i, ˜̇qi) is only accepted when the




, ∀t ≥ 0. (3.20)
The following proposition shows the above simple condition can detect the
proposed static MCoMA:
Proposition 3.2.1. Consider BTOS dynamics (3.4) controlled by (3.5). The pro-
posed static MCoMA in Theorem 3.1.1 can be detected if the detection condition
(3.20) is checked for the received data on both master and slave side.
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Proof:
Let the ‘attack gain’ be
K =

K11 K12 K13 K14
K21 K22 K23 K24
K31 K32 K33 K34
K41 K42 K43 K44

, (3.21)
where Kij ∈ Rn×n, i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are constant matrices. Thus, the modified
state q̃ is given by (3.12) as
˜̇qs = (K11 + In)q̇s +K12qs +K13q̇m +K14qm
q̃s = K21q̇s + (K22 + In)qs +K23q̇m +K24qm
˜̇qm = K31q̇s +K32qs + (K33 + In)q̇m +K34qm
q̃m = K41q̇s +K42qs +K43q̇m + (K44 + In)qm
(3.22)
Using the dynamics equations (3.4) in (3.22) gives
˙̃qs = K21M
−1
s (qs)(us − Cs(q̇s, qs)q̇s) + (K22 + In)q̇s +K23M−1m (qm)(um
− Cm(q̇m, qs)q̇m) +K24q̇m,
˙̃qm = K41M
−1
s (qs)(us − Cs(q̇s, qs)q̇s) +K42q̇s +K43M−1m (qm)(um − Cm(q̇m, qs)q̇m)
+ (K44 + In)q̇m.
(3.23)
Assume the static MCoMA (3.22) can bypass detection condition (3.20), thus both
˙̃qs and ˙̃qm given by (3.23) should be linear in q̇s and q̇m. Equivalently,
K21 = K23 = K41 = K43 = 0n. (3.24)
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Substituting (3.24) in (3.23) gives,
˙̃qs = (K22 + In)q̇s +K24q̇m,
˙̃qm = K42q̇s + (K44 + In)q̇m.
(3.25)
Using (3.25) and (3.22), it is clear that (3.20) holds if and only if
K12 = K14 = K32 = K34 = 0n,
K11 = K22 = G1, K13 = K24 = G2,
K31 = K42 = G3, K33 = K44 = G4.
(3.26)




G1 0n G2 0n
0n G1 0n G2
G3 0n G4 0n
0n G3 0n G4

, (3.27)
where Gj ∈ Rn×n are constant matrices. In Theorem 3.1.1, it is shown that with
q̃ = q +Kq, V̇ = qTPq, where P := A+BK is positive semidefinite and given by
P =

−(Kd +Kdm)In +KdG3 KpG3 Kd(In +G4) KpG4
0n 0n 0n 0n
Kd(In +G1) KpG1 −(Kd +Kdm)In +KdG2 KpG2





V̇ (0) = q(0)TPq(0) ≥ 0, ∀q(0) ∈ R4n\E. (3.29)
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Inequality (3.29) should hold for







T , q̇s, qs ∈ Rn\{0n}.
Substituting this q(0) in (3.29) implies,
P1 =
 −(Kd +Kdm)In +KdG3 KpG3
0n 0n
 (3.30)
should be a positive semidefinite matrix.









is symmetric positive semidefinite. From generalized Schur’s complement condition
[67], P1 + P
T
1 is a symmetric positive semidefinite if and only if
P
′





−2(Kd +Kdm)In +Kd(G3 +GT3 )
)−
G3





can not be symmetric positive semidefinite simultaneously. Thus, by contradiction,
the static MCoMA in Theorem 3.1.1 can be detected by the detection condition
(3.20), which completes the proof.

As discussed in Section 2.3, the simple detection condition (3.20) is not suffi-
cient for protecting the system, because it is easy for the attacker to design the injec-
tion data (q̂i, ˆ̇qi) for (qi, q̇i) such that the detection condition (3.20) is satisfied, which
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means the detection is bypassed. Thus, the physics-based attack detection scheme
with an encoding-decoding structure proposed in Section 2.3 should be adopted for
detecting general content modification attack, which includes MCoMA as a special
case.
3.2.2 Attack Detection on General Content Modification Attack
As shown in Section 3.1.2, MCoMA is only a special content modification
attack. In the case that the attacker just launches a general content modification
attack defined as (2.1) and (2.2) to disrupt the system, we can adopt the physics-
based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding structure proposed in
Section 2.3 for BTOS as shown in Fig. 3.2. For simplicity, only one transmission
direction from the master robot to the slave robot is shown in Fig. 3.2, and the
implementation in the opposite transmission direction is the same.
3.3 Experiment
In this section, the theoretical results are tested on a BTOS experimental
platform which consists of two PHANToM Omni robots. The PHANToM Omni
robot, developed by SensAble Technology, is a 6 degree-of-freedom (DOF) haptic
device which can apply a force feedback on the user’s hand, and allow the user to
feel virtual objects and interact with the virtual environment.
The Omni robot consists of 6 revolute joints where the last 3 joints are not
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Figure 3.2: Physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-








Figure 3.3: The PHANToM Omni haptic device.
of the device. Since the first 3 joints are actuated, it can be used as a low-cost 3
DOF manipulator in the research of robotics control.
To set up a simple BTOS, two PHANToM Omni haptic robots are used. Each
robot is interfaced to a desktop powered with Intel Core2Quad processor, 16GB
RAM and operating system Windows 7, using FireWire 400 (IEEE 1394) cable.
The program to control each robot was written in C++ using the OpenHaptics
API (v 3.1), which is developed by SensAble Technologies for PHANToM devices.
For nominal BTOS operations, the considered PD-like control with empirically fine
tuned gains is implemented. The complete experiment setup is shown in Fig. 4.12.
For networking, Windows socket API is utilized and packets are transmitted in
UDP format through the Ethernet. The payload of each packet consists of the
robot’s joint angles and rate of change of respective joint angles. There is no packet
fragmentation required.
The application layer of the program consists of three supplementary threads
along with the primary - main thread, which initializes the network sockets, and
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SlaveMaster
Firewire 400 Firewire 400
Attacker
Figure 3.4: The BTOS experiment setup.
starts and stops the supplementary threads. The first thread is responsible for in-
teracting with the robot, synchronizing with encoders and joint motors, computing
the rate of change of joint angles and the control action for each motor. The second
thread is responsible for handling the inbound packets, reading the UDP sockets,
parsing the packet payload, and extracting the values of joint angles and their rate
of change. The third thread is responsible for handling the outbound packets, cre-
ating the packet payload, and queuing it at the UDP socket for transmission. The
transport layer and layers beneath it are implemented by the Windows kernel.
To emulate the ‘man-in-the-middle’ attacker, equivalent changes to the re-
ceived packet payload are made in the reception thread of the robots’ application
programs (refer to Fig. 3.5). The ‘man-in-the-middle’ can also be easily emulated
by a third computer relaying between the two robots.
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Figure 3.5: The application architecture of the master robot for the
MCoMA experiment. The same architecture is used for the slave robot’s
application program.
Milliseconds













Figure 3.6: The storage function V under static MCoMA.
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3.3.1 MCoMA Design
Assuming no detection scheme in BTOS, a simple static MCoMA is designed
using Proposition 3.1.4 to attack the system. The following control gains are
selected:
Kp = 600, Kd = 5 and Kdm = 5
The ‘attack gain’ K ∈ R12×12 is designed as
K =

03 03 03 03
K21 03 K23 + Λ4 03
03 03 03 03
K41 + Λ2 03 K43 03

.
From (3.16), K41 = K23 = diag([s1, s1, s1]), K21 = K43 = diag([s2, s2, s2]), with
s1 = (Kd +Kdm)/Kp, s2 = −Kd/Kp. Λ4 and Λ2 are chosen as diag([1.5, 1.5, 1.5]).
In order to protect the system from real damage, an inherent maximum joint
speed limit is added on the robots. Additionally, the system storage function value
is only observed and recorded during a short time interval after launching the attack.
Under this attack, the storage function V of BTOS is shown in Fig. 3.6. The
storage function is chattering while it is increasing, which is due to the inherent
physical limit of the robot joint space.
3.3.2 Attack Detection on General Content Modification Attack
The proposed detection scheme in Section 3.2.2 is tested under general content
modification attacks. Here the sampling period Ti = 4ms. In the detection scheme,
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for i = m, s, the initial values of (iλia,
iλib) are set to be (
iλ0a,
iλ0b) = (5,−2) and the
update laws fa, fb in (2.4) and (2.5) are designed as
fa = 20 cos(10kiTi), fb = −20 sin(10kiTi), ki = 1, 2, 3, . . .
It can be verified that iλkiia 6=
iλkiib , ki = 1, 2, 3, . . . .
In the Case 1, the proposed detection scheme is tested without additional
artificial network delay. Then in the Case 2, in order to verify that the detection
scheme is independent of network delay as discussed in Remark 2.3.1, a 400ms
one-way network delay is added artificially using a software called clumsy1.
Case 1:
In order to determine the threshold εi in (2.16), we can run the BTOS with
the detection scheme implemented under a normal operation condition (no attack)
for a certain period of time, save all the position and velocity data, then compute
the checking error ei in (2.16) for all the saved data points, and set the value of εi
larger than all the computed ei. In this experiment, to determine εm, we use the
master robot to teleoperate the slave robot under a normal operation condition for
a certain period of time, and the computed checking error on the slave side em is
shown in Fig. 3.7. Based on this plot, we select the threshold as εm = 0.0015. It
is also worth noting that the teleoperation performance remains unaffected during
the operation in the absence of any content modification attack.
In the experiment, the attacker launches a general content modification attack
on (rkmma, r
km















Figure 3.7: The checking error em on the slave side under a normal
operation condition in Case 1.
as (r̂kmma, r̂
km
mb) = (−0.01 sin(0.2t), 0.01 cos(0.2t)). The plot of the checking error em
on the slave side is shown in Fig. 3.8. The attack is successfully detected once the
attack is launched at km = 3000 since the checking error em instantly exceeds the
threshold εm = 0.0015 (red line in Fig. 3.8). In this experiment, when checking
condition in (2.16) is violated, the robots just drop the received data and stay still
to protect the system.
Based on (2.17), checking error rate emd can be computed, and the its plot
is shown in Fig. 3.9. We can find there is sharp spike in the trajectory when the
attack appears, which can be used as an additional indication on the attack.
Case 2:
In this case, a 400ms one-way delay is added in the network. The same
approach in Case 1 is adopted to determine the threshold εi. The computed error
em is shown in Fig. 3.10, and εm is also set as 0.0015.
The attacker also launched the same general content modification attack on
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Figure 3.8: The checking error em (blue line) on the slave side under
a general content modification attack in Case 1. The red line is the
determined threshold ε = 0.0015.






Figure 3.9: The checking error rate emd on the slave side under a general
content modification attack in Case 1.
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Figure 3.10: The checking error em on the slave side under a normal
operation condition in Case 2.
(rkmma, r
km
mb) from km = 3000 as Case 1. The plot of the checking error em on the slave
side is shown in Fig. 3.11. The attack is successfully detected after the attack is
launched at km = 3000, as the checking error em exceeds the threshold εm = 0.0015
(red line in Fig. 3.11).
Based on (2.17), checking error rate emd can also be computed for this case,
and the its plot is shown in Fig. 3.12. We can find there is sharp spike in the
trajectory when the attack appears, which can be used as an additional indication
on the attack.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, content modification attacks are studied for a nonlinear bi-
lateral teleoperation system where an attacker can change the data contents being
communicated between the master and slave robot. The main motivation for the
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Figure 3.11: The checking error em (blue line) on the slave side under
a general content modification attack with an artificial network delay in
Case 2. The red line is the determined threshold ε = 0.0015.







Figure 3.12: The checking error rate emd on the slave side under a general
content modification attack in Case 2.
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work is to utilize the underlying physics of robotic systems to better understand the
attack impact and provide a different perspective on the system security from ex-
isting cryptographic tools. Consequently, the static MCoMA is designed to demon-
strate the severe attack impact, and the physics-based attack detection scheme with
an encoding-decoding structure is adopted to detect general content modification
attacks. The effectiveness of the attack design and the detection scheme is verified
through experiments.
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Chapter 4: Content Modification Attack on Multi-Robot System
In this chapter, a multi-robot system modeled as a MAS with double-integrator
dynamics is considered. Specifically, we consider the synchronization problem for
a second order MAS with undirected topology under the content modification at-
tack, which can externally intercept the communication links and corrupt the data
content.
The results of this chapter can be summarized as follows: Following a similar
approach for BTOS, to demonstrate the severe attack impact on second order MAS
synchronization, a static MCoMA is first designed. Since multiple links among
MAS can be attacked, an optimal MCoMA that is distributed and compromises the
least number of links is also designed. The physics-based attack detection condition
(4.29) is applied for detecting static MCoMA. The physics-based attack detection
scheme with an encoding-decoding structure proposed in Section 2.3 is also applied
to protect against general content modification attacks. Additionally, a velocity
observer-based attack mitigation scheme is also discussed for MCoMA. The efficacy
of the proposed results is illustrated through numerical simulations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 provides a brief





Figure 4.1: Multi-agent system modeled by an undirected graph with
agents as the nodes and communication links as edges.
ification attack design is presented in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, the attack detec-
tion/mitigation schemes are discussed for MAS. Finally, the simulation results are
shown in Section 4.4.
4.1 Preliminary
4.1.1 Graph theory
The MAS can be modeled as a graph (Fig. 4.1). This section reviews some
concepts and facts in the graph theory that are used in this chapter.
Consider a graph G = {V , E} consists of a set of nodes V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a
set of edges E = {(i, j) ∈ V × V|i, j adjacent}. Nodes i, j are adjacent means there
exists an edge (i, j) between two nodes.
The graph G is called undirected if (i, j) ∈ E ⇔ (j, i) ∈ E . The adjacency
matrix is a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n with element aij = 1 if i, j are adjacent and
aij = 0 otherwise. The diagonal elements aii are zero since the self-loop case will
not be considered. The degree matrix is a diagonal matrix D ∈ Rn×n with element
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di equals to the cardinality of the node i’s neighbor set Ni = {j ∈ V|(i, j) ∈ E}.





aij, lij = −aij, i 6= j. (4.1)
For an undirected graph G, L is a symmetric and positive semidefinite. Observing
the fact that the row sum of L is zero, the vector 1n = [1, 1, . . . , 1]
T ∈ Rn is a right
eigenvector of L associated with the eigenvalue λ = 0, i.e., L1n = 0.
A path from node i to j is a sequence of distinct nodes from i to j, such
that each pair of consecutive nodes are adjacent. If there is a path from i to j,
then i, j are called connected. If all pairs of nodes in G are connected, then G is
called connected. For connected graphs, L has exactly one zero eigenvalue. The
eigenvalues of L can be listed in an increasing order as 0 = λ1 < λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λn.
The second smallest eigenvalue λ2 is called algebraic connectivity of a graph, which
is a measure of performance/speed of synchronization algorithm [18].
4.1.2 Existing synchronization protocol
This section reviews the existing graph-Laplacian based synchronization pro-
tocol for MAS with double-integrator dynamics presented in [33–35].
The MAS is modeled by a graph G = {V , E} with agents as the nodes and com-
munication links as edges. The following assumptions hold throughout the chapter:
(A4.1) Graph G is undirected and connected.
(A4.2) The communication condition is perfect (network effects are neglected),
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which can isolate the effect of cyber attack on MAS in later sections.











ui, i ∈ V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, (4.2)
where qi ∈ R, i ∈ V and q̇i ∈ R, i ∈ V are generalized coordinates and their rate of
change, respectively. Henceforth, for simplicity we shall just refer to qi as position
and q̇i as velocity of any agent i ∈ V . The state qi, q̇i are treated as scalar here,
but the results can be extended to higher dimensional case using the concepts of
Kronecker product.




[(qi − qj) + β(q̇i − q̇j)] , i ∈ V (4.3)
where β ∈ R+ is referred to as coupling gain of relative velocities.
Definition 4.1.1. Consensus is achieved by the MAS described by (4.2) - (4.3), if
for any (i, j) ∈ V × V
lim
t→∞
(qi(t)− qj(t)) = 0 and lim
t→∞
(q̇i(t)− q̇j(t)) = 0 (4.4)
Let q = [q1, q2, . . . , qn]
T , q̇ = [q̇1, q̇2, . . . , q̇n]





synchronization protocol (4.3), (4.2) can be written in compact matrix form as





Following from these notational substitutions, (4.4) is equivalent to x(t) → E as
t→∞, where
E := {x ∈ R2n|q ∈ span(1n), q̇ ∈ span(1n)} (4.6)
The convergence analysis of synchronization protocol (4.3) is done by Lya-
punov function analysis similar to Theorem 1 of [35].
Theorem 4.1.1. The synchronization is achieved by the MAS (4.2)-(4.3) for any
β ∈ R+.
Proof:
From (A4.1), both L and L2 are positive semidefinite with exactly one zero
valued eigenvalue and
N (L) = N (L2) = span(1n). (4.7)
Let q = α1n + δq and q̇ = γ1n + δq̇, where δq ∈ span{1n}⊥, δq̇ ∈ span{1n}⊥ are






q̇T1n are simply the components of q and q̇ along 1n, respectively.
Substituting q = α1n + δq and q̇ = γ1n + δq̇ in (4.5) gives us the following
dynamics of the disagreement vectors,









]T ∈ Dδ and α̇ = γ, γ̇ = 0. Dδ = span{[1Tn , 0Tn]T , [0Tn , 1Tn]T}⊥
is a vector space of dimension 2n − 2. From (4.7), (4.8) has a single equilibrium
point at the origin in Dδ.
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x = 12qTL2q + 12 q̇TLq̇ (4.9)
Since L  0, we have L2  0, which implies P  0. Thus V ≥ 0,∀x ∈ R2n.








x = −βq̇TL2q̇ ≤ 0, (4.10)









From (4.7), V defined in (4.11) is positive definite and radially unbounded in
Dδ. Thus, V is a Lyapunov candidate function for the system (4.8).
Similarly, substituting q̇ = γ1n + δq̇ in (4.10) gives
V̇ = −βδTq̇ L2δq̇ ≤ 0 (4.12)
Since V in (4.11) is radially unbounded and V̇ ≤ 0, ∀δ ∈ Dδ, the set Ωc =
{δ ∈ Dδ |V ≤ c, c > 0} is a compact, positively invariant set. Let
Sδ = {δ ∈ Dδ | V̇ = 0} (4.13)
From (4.7), Sδ = {δ ∈ Dδ | δq̇ = 0n}. It is easy to verify that Eδ = {δ ∈
Dδ | δq = 0n, δq̇ = 0n} is the largest invariant set in Sδ. Hence, from LaSalle’s
invariance principle [66], the origin of (4.8) is globally asymptotically stable.
This implies, x(t)→ E as t→∞.

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4.2 Attack Design for MAS
In this section, the content modification attack design is discussed in the con-
text of MAS. In subsection 4.2.1, to better understand the vulnerability of MAS and
severity of attack issue, a static MCoMA is designed from the attacker’s perspec-
tive, where the attacker’s goal is to ensure unbounded growth of the storage function
(4.9). In Section 4.2.2, an optimal MCoMA (OMCoMA) is further discussed based
on the static MCoMA.
Based on Definition 2.1.1, the attacker can launch a content modification
attack on MAS by compromising an edge set Ē ⊆ E and therefore modify the
information being exchanged in the edge set Ē at will.
Given the assumptions made in Section 2.1, in the context of MAS, we assume
(A3.3) The attacker is able to completely hack the communication links rep-
resented by the edges in the set Ē . Here, completely hack refers to the attacker’s
capability of breaking existing cryptographic tools like encryption or message au-
thentication code (MAC).
(A3.4) The attack is launched at t = ta ≥ 0, and MAS state x does not lie in
the synchronization set E defined in (4.6) at t = ta, i.e., x(ta) /∈ E.




In this subsection, based on Definition 2.2.1, the MCoMA with respect to
storage function V in (4.9) is studied.
Associate a basis vector ei with every node i ∈ V , where ei is the i-th column
of In. Let Ā and D̄ be the adjacency matrix and degree matrix of subgraph Ḡ :=
{V , Ē}, then the information of node i is available to the attacker if and only if
||Āei||0 = 1Tn Āei 6= 0.
As Ā = ĀT (from (A3.3)), thus the total number of completely hacked edges
associated with node i is given as 1Tn Āei. Define Va = {i ∈ V|1Tn Āei 6= 0} ⊆ V
as the set of compromised nodes, hence the attack space which is defined as Sna =
span{ei, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}| i ∈ Va} has dimension |Va|. For simplifying the attack
analysis, let us define an attack operator
Oa = D̄ = diag(Ā1n) (4.14)
which basically maps Rn to Sna linearly.
For each node i ∈ Va and edge (i, j) ∈ Ē , the attacker can modify the infor-
mation (qi, q̇i) of node i to (q̃i, ˜̇qi) being received by node j as
















where Kpij ∈ R1×2n and Kvij ∈ R1×2n are termed as the position attack gain and
velocity attack gain associated with edge (i, j) ∈ Ē , respectively.






[(qj − qi) + β(q̇j − q̇i)] +
∑
i∈N̄j











j )(I2 ⊗Oa)x (4.16)
where N̄j = {i ∈ V|(i, j) ∈ Ē} and x = [qT , q̇T ]T .
For uniformity, we associate position attack gains and velocity attack gains




















where, Kpj , K
v








j ∈ Rn×n for all j ∈ V . Ideally, if
(i, j) /∈ Ē then Kpij = Kvij = 0T2n. But, even in case these gains are not identically
zero, the adjacency vector Āj associated with j ∈ V and the attack operator Oa will
limit the effect of the attack only to the compromised nodes (nodes that belong to
Va).
Substituting (4.16) in MAS dynamics (4.5) gives

































are referred to as attack gains.
Next, we give sufficient and necessary conditions for the attack (4.15) to be
MCoMA.
Theorem 4.2.1. Consider the dynamics of MAS (4.5) under content modification
attack (4.15), i.e. (4.18). The content modification attack (4.15) is a MCoMA with
respect to storage function V in (4.9) if and only if
(a) attack gains ∆p and ∆v in (4.18) satisfies ∆p = 0n and R := −2βL2 + L∆v +
∆Tv L  0,
(b) set F\E is not positively invariant, where F := {x ∈ R2n|q̇TRq̇ = 0}.
Proof:
Consider the storage function V = 1
2
xTPx in (4.9). Clearly, V = 0, ∀x ∈ E
and V > 0, ∀x ∈ R2n\E.










x := 12xTMx (4.20)
Sufficiency:
From (A3.4), x(ta) /∈ E, thus V (ta) is positive. Now
If (a) ∆p = 0n and R  0, then V̇ ≥ 0. Thus, V > 0 and x /∈ E,∀t ≥ ta.
For condition (b), we need first show E ⊂ F. For x ∈ E, we have q̇ ∈ span(1n).
We can easily verify that q̇TRq̇ = 0 when q̇ ∈ span(1n). Thus, x ∈ F, which implies
E ⊂ F.
If (b) the set F\E is not positively invariant, V̇ will not always stay in 0, thus
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V →∞ as t→∞.
Hence, by Definition 2.2.1, the content modification attack is MCoMA with
respect to storage function V in (4.9).
Necessity:
By Definition 2.2.1, if the content modification attack is MCoMA, then V̇ ≥ 0
in (4.20), which implies M  0. By generalized Schur’s complement condition [67],
for M  0, we should have R  0 and −∆TpLR−L∆p  0. This can only be satisfied
when ∆p = 0n. Further, V → ∞ as t → ∞, implies the set F\E should not be
positively invariant. Hence, both (a) and (b) are necessary.

Since the attack gains (4.19) are constant matrices, the proposed MCoMA is
also referred to as static MCoMA.
Remark 4.2.1. Amongst all possible choices for the attacker to modify the data
content in the compromised link, the proposed MCoMA guarantees nonnegative
increase rate of the storage function (4.9) and ensures that limt→∞ V = ∞. This
could be catastrophic for the individual agent in the MAS and in some cases, can
even cause physical damage to the agents.
Remark 4.2.2. Given Oa and Ā, the attacker can compute the position attack gains
and velocity attack gains by choosing an appropriate Q = QT  0 such that the
following feasibility problem has a nonempty solution set. This problem is a linear
programming problem as the constraints are all linear matrix inequalities (LMI),
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which can be solved efficiently.
minimize 1
subject to:
(C1) ∆p = 0n
(C2) L∆v + ∆
T
v L = Q+ 2βL
2
(4.21)
If there exists Q = QT  0 such that the solution set of (4.21) is nonempty
then clearly R = Q  0 and condition (a) of Theorem 4.2.1 holds. R  0 implies
F\E = {x ∈ R2n| q /∈ span(1n), q̇ = 0} and from (4.18) we get, q̈ = −Lq 6= 0 in
F\E which makes F\E a non-invariant set. Hence, the content modification attack
with position attack gains and velocity attack gains belonging to the solution set of
(4.21) is MCoMA.
4.2.2 Optimal MCoMA Design
In order to maximize the damage and minimize the cost of attack at the same
time, it is desirable for MCoMA to be distributed and compromise least number of
edges possible in any given graph.
A distributed MCoMA means for any (i, j) ∈ Ē , only the i-th and j-th el-
ements of the associated Kpij and K
v
ij are non-zero. In words, this means that a
content modification of states being exchanged on any completely hacked link is
not dependent in any way on the content modification of states being exchanged
on any other completely hacked links. Due to this reason distributed MCoMA is
much easier to execute and has higher scalability and lower communication cost.
71
MCoMA
Distributed Least number 
of edges
Optimal MCoMA
Figure 4.2: The relation between OMCoMA and MCoMA.
The relation between OMCoMA and MCoMA can be illustrated by Fig. 4.2.
Definition 4.2.1. The optimal MCoMA or OMCoMA is referred to as a MCoMA
which is distributed and compromises least number of edges for any given graph.
Next proposition gives a distributed MCoMA design:
Proposition 4.2.3. Consider the dynamics of MAS (4.5) under content modifica-
tion attack (4.15), i.e. (4.18). If
∆p = 0n, ∆v = ∆
T
v = θIn (4.22)
where θ satisfies θ ≥ βλn, where λn is the maximum eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix
L, then the content modification attack (4.15) is a MCoMA with respect to storage
function V in (4.9).
Before the proof is provided, a lemma which will be used in the proof is stated
as follows:
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Lemma 4.2.1. (Theorem 3 in [69]) Let A and B be two real positive semidefinite
matrices, then AB  0 if and only if AB is normal.
Now the proof of Proposition 4.2.3 is given:
Proof:
Choosing ∆Tv = ∆v = θIn, we have
R = −2βL2 + 2L∆v = 2L(∆v − βL) = 2L(θIn − βL). (4.23)
Since θ ≥ βλn, we have θIn−βL  0. Now from Lemma 4.2.1, R = 2L(θIn−
βL)  0 since R is normal and thus condition (a) in Theorem 4.2.1 is satisfied.
As L = TΛT−1 by a similarity transformation and from (4.7), we get
R = 2L(θIn − βL) = T (2θΛ− 2βΛ2)T−1, (4.24)
where 2θΛ−2βΛ2 also has exactly one zero eigenvalue, which means dim(N (R)) = 1
and N (R) = span(1n).
This implies
F = {x ∈ R2n|q̇TRq̇ = 0} = {x ∈ R2n|q̇ ∈ span(1n)}. (4.25)
Hence, F\E = {x ∈ R2n|q̇ ∈ span(1n), q /∈ span(1n)}.
With ∆p,∆v defined in (4.22), the velocity dynamics be written as
q̈ = −Lq − βLq̇ + θInq̇. (4.26)
Multiplying by L on both sides of equation, we get
Lq̈ = −L2q − βL2q̇ + θLq̇. (4.27)
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When the system state is in F\E, Lq̇ = 0, L2q̇ = 0 and L2q 6= 0, thus Lq̈ 6= 0,
which implies q̈ /∈ span(1n). Thus, F\E is not positively invariant set, which satisfies
condition (b) in Theorem 4.2.1.
Hence, by Theorem 4.2.1, the content modification attack given in the propo-
sition is MCoMA with respect to storage function V in (4.9).

Observing the MCoMA injection term θInq̇ in (4.26), it is evident that the
proposed static MCoMA in Proposition 4.2.3 is in fact distributed, i.e. there is no
information exchange required between the attacks targeting different edges.
The result proposed in the following corollary of Theorem 4.2.1 is critical for
the design of MCoMA with minimum |Ē |.
Corollary 4.2.1. For a graph G = {V , E}, suppose the attack space of MCoMA is
denoted by Sna as defined in Section 4.2.1 and dim(Sna ) = |Va|, then we always have
|Va| = |V|.
Proof: Clearly, for any content modification attack, we have |Va| ≤ |V|.
(Proof by Contradiction.) Assume |Va| < |V|, which means some of the nodes
are not compromised by the MCoMA. This implies, there exists non-zero number of
zero rows in matrix ∆v, and symmetrically, there exist zero columns in ∆v Conse-
quently, corresponding diagonal element(s) of L∆v + ∆
T
v L are zero as well. Hence,
the matrix R as defined in (a) of Theorem 4.2.1 has negative diagonal element(s)
and hence is not positive semidefinite. However, a necessary condition for a con-





Figure 4.3: An instance of minimum edge cover for the graph in Fig. 4.1.
contradicts the given fact that the content modification is MCoMA.
Hence, by contradiction |Va| < |V| cannot hold, thus |Va| = |V|.

The implications of Corollary 4.2.1 are
• None of the diagonal entries of the attack operator Oa is zero for MCoMA.
• The OMCoMA design problem is now reduced to the minimum edge cover
problem (given in (4.28)) : finding the least number of compromised edges







{i, j} = V
(4.28)
Note: The minimum edge cover problem (4.28) is also known as maximum
matching problem. [70] introduces an algorithm in Section 10.5 to solve this problem
for a graph G = {V , E} in O(|V|4) time.
To summarize, OMCoMA defined in Definition 4.2.1 can be designed as
following:
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• Firstly, solve the minimum edge cover problem (4.28) to obtain optimal Ē .
• Secondly, implement the distributed attack based on Proposition 4.2.3.
4.3 Attack Detection/Mitigation for MAS
In this section, the attack detection/mitigation scheme on static MCoMA for
MAS is first studied, and then the attack detection scheme for general content
modification attacks is discussed.
4.3.1 Attack Detection/Mitigation on Static MCoMA
In this subsection, the attack detection and mitigation scheme for MAS syn-
chronization against the static MCoMA in Theorem 4.2.1 is proposed.
4.3.1.1 Attack Detection
In this part, the detection condition in (2.3) can be applied for detecting static
MCoMA for MAS. To further interpret this, let us consider one compromised edge
(i, j) ∈ Ē as Fig. 4.4. Suppose the attacker modifies (qi, q̇i) to (q̃i, ˜̇qi), the data is
only accepted by agent j when the following detection condition is satisfied:
˜̇qi(t) = ˙̃qi(t), ∀t ≥ 0. (4.29)
The following proposition demonstrates that the proposed static MCoMA can
be detected with simple detection condition (4.29).
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MCoMA
(qi , !qi )
(qj , !qj )
( !qi , "!qi )
( !qj , "!qj )
i j
!"qi (t) = "!qi (t), ∀t ≥ 0
!"qj (t) = "!qj (t), ∀t ≥ 0
Figure 4.4: Attack detection scheme for static MCoMA on edge (i, j).
Proposition 4.3.1. Consider the dynamics of MAS (4.5) under content modifi-
cation attack (4.15), i.e. (4.18). The static MCoMA in Theorem 4.2.1 can be
detected if the detection condition (4.29) is checked for the received data at all the
agents in MAS.
Proof:
For each node i ∈ Va and edge (i, j) ∈ Ē , consider the attack (4.15),
q̃i = qi + q̄i = qi +K
p
ij(I2 ⊗Oa)x,





















Because for a MCoMA, ∆p and ∆v in (4.18) satisfies ∆p = 0n and R =







and Kvij = [0
T
n |Kvvij ].
(Proof by Contradiction.) Now assume the MCoMA avoids the detection
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condition (4.29) imposed on (4.30), which means the attacker can make
Kvij(I2 ⊗Oa)x = K
p
ij(I2 ⊗Oa)ẋ (4.31)
Substituting (4.18) into above equation gives
Kvij(I2 ⊗Oa)x = K
p
ij(I2 ⊗Oa)(Γ + ∆)x (4.32)
The left hand side of (4.32) is
Kvij(I2 ⊗Oa)x = [0Tn |Kvvij ]
 Oa 0n
0a Oa
x = [0Tn |Kvvij Oa]x (4.33)
The right hand side of (4.32) is




















So (4.32) is equivalent to










further implies ∆v = 0n and thereby R = −2βL2 is negative semidefinite.
However, the MCoMA requires R  0. Hence, by contradiction, the static




(qi , !qi )
(qj , !qj )
( !qi , "!qi )






(qi ,0) (qi ,0)
(qj ,0) (qj ,0)
Figure 4.5: Attack mitigation scheme for static MCoMA on edge (i, j).

4.3.1.2 Attack Mitigation
In this part, a velocity observer from [34] is used to mitigate the proposed
static MCoMA.
Proposition 4.3.2. Consider the dynamics of MAS (4.5) under content modifi-
cation attack (4.15), i.e. (4.18). As shown in Fig. 4.5, once the proposed static
MCoMA is detected, each agent i ∈ V transmits (qi, 0) instead of (qi, q̇i) and switches






(qi − qj)− p ˙̂zi, (4.36)
˙̂zi = −τ ẑi +
∑
j∈Ni
(qi − qj), i ∈ V (4.37)
where p, τ ∈ R+ and ẑi ∈ R is the observer state.
With above attack mitigation scheme, the synchronization of MAS defined by
Definition 4.1.1 is still achieved under the static MCoMA.
Proof:
By (4.30) and (4.33), the injection signals are
q̄i = K
p
ij(I2 ⊗Oa)x = [0Tn |K
pv





ij(I2 ⊗Oa)x = [0Tn |Kvvij Oa]x = Kvvij Oaq̇,
(4.38)
which are in static feedback form of the velocities.
Since each agent i ∈ V transmits (qi, 0) instead of (qi, q̇i) once the MCoMA is
detected, thus from (4.38), the injection signals are zero.
Thus, for each agent i ∈ V , the received position information qj, j ∈ Ni for
synchronization algorithm (4.36) and (4.37) is not compromised.
For the convergence analysis for local observer based synchronization algorithm
(4.36) and (4.37), the reader is referred to Theorem 4.1 in [34] and is omitted here.

4.3.2 Attack Detection for General Content Modification Attack
In the case that the attacker just launches a general content modification attack





















































km = makm (rma
km − rmb








Figure 4.6: Attack detection scheme for general content modification
attack on edge (m, s) for MAS.
the physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding structure pro-




Consider a MAS modeled by a graph in Fig. 4.1 satisfying assumption (A4.1)
and (A4.2). The Laplacian matrix L of this graph is
L =

2 −1 0 0 −1 0
−1 3 −1 0 −1 0
0 −1 2 −1 0 0
0 0 −1 3 −1 −1
−1 −1 0 −1 3 0
0 0 0 −1 0 1

.
Firstly, suppose there is no attack and the synchronization algorithm (4.3)
with β = 2 is implemented for each agent. The simulation results are shown in
Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8. We can find the synchronization is reached after 6s, and
the storage function V in (4.9) and function rate V̇ converge to zero rapidly. This
verifies the efficacy of existing synchronization algorithm as analyzed in Theorem
4.1.1.
Secondly, suppose OMCoMA is designed as Proposition 4.2.3 with θ = βλn
and launched as Fig. 4.3, wherein the edge (1,5), (2,3), (4,6) are compromised.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10. It is evident that the
position and velocity states diverge rapidly, the storage function V in (4.9) keeps
increasing rapidly, and function rate V̇ is nonnegative. This simply verifies the effect
of proposed OMCoMA as in Definition 4.2.1.
Next, the attack detection scheme in Proposition 4.3.1 and mitigation scheme
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Figure 4.7: The position and velocity states of MAS under synchroniza-
tion algorithm (4.3).
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Figure 4.8: The storage function V and storage function rate V̇ of MAS
under synchronization algorithm (4.3).
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Figure 4.9: The position and velocity states of MAS under OMCoMA.
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Figure 4.11: The position and velocity states of MAS under OM-
CoMA with attack detection scheme in Proposition 4.3.1 and miti-
gation scheme in Proposition 4.3.2.
in Proposition 4.3.2 are implemented in the MAS. The above OMCoMA is launched
at ta=3s. The parameters for the observer based synchronization algorithm (4.36)
and (4.37) are selected as p = τ = 2 and the initial values ẑi,∀i ∈ V are randomly
chosen from [−0.2, 0.2]. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12.
The position and velocity states converge before 3s. When OMCoMA is launched
at 3s, it is detected by (4.29). MAS switches the synchronization algorithm from
(4.3) to (4.36) and (4.37). The synchronization is finally reached. Additionally, the
storage function V in (4.9) and the function rate V̇ finally converge to zero. This
demonstrates that the proposed attack detection and mitigation method secures the
synchronization under the proposed MCoMA.
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Figure 4.12: The storage function V and rate V̇ of MAS under OM-
CoMA with attack detection scheme in Proposition 4.3.1 and mitiga-
tion scheme in Proposition 4.3.2.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, the vulnerability of MAS synchronization has been demon-
strated by designing and analyzing MCoMA. An optimal MCoMA is then de-
signed. The attack detection/mitigation scheme for MCoMA and the attack de-
tection scheme for general content modification attacks are also discussed.
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Chapter 5: Content Modification Attacks on Bilateral Tele-Driving
System
In this chapter, the cyber-physical security issue is studied for a BTDS under
content modification attacks, which can modify the data transmitted between the
human operator and the tele-driven vehicle.
The results of this chapter can be summarized as follows: A passivity-based
adaptive bilateral tele-driving control scheme is first proposed that enables a human
operator to tele-drive a car-like mobile robot with haptic feedback in the presence of
communication delays and dynamic parametric uncertainties. The static MCoMA
is designed for the proposed tele-driving system. The physics-based attack detec-
tion scheme with an encoding-decoding structure is adopted for detecting general
content modification attacks on the tele-driving system. MCoMA design and at-
tack detection scheme are verified through various simulations. An initial BTDS
experimental platform is also developed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.1, the proposed
tele-driving control scheme is first presented. Then, the attack design is discussed
in Section 5.2. The detection scheme is discussed in Section 5.3. Finally, all the














Figure 5.1: The sketch for tele-driving scheme: qm1, qm2 are two joint
variables of the local joystick, β is the steering angle, ω is the angular
velocity of the front wheel, v is the linear velocity of the front wheel,
Tmd, Tsd are constant communication delays and rm, r̄s are the transmit-
ted data defined later in Section 5.1.
5.1 Bilateral Tele-driving Control Scheme
As shown in Fig. 5.1, in BTDS, a human driver can a use 2 DOF local
robot (joystick) to tele-drive a car-like remote robot through communication net-
works. This two DOF system can be analogously considered as steering wheel and
gas/breaking pedal inputs. As introduced in Section 1.2.3, a tele-driving scheme
with a new control mode is proposed in this work, where (qm1, β)-coordination and
(qm2, ω̇)-coordination (see Fig. 5.1) is achieved. Here (., .) implies that these signals
track each other asymptotically. Specifically, (qm1, β)-coordination and (qm2, ω̇)-
coordination imply that the local robot’s link variables qm1, qm2 are used to control
the steering angle β and the angular acceleration ω̇, respectively. In the proposed
setup, the (qm2, ω̇)-coordination is equivalent to a (qm2, v̇)-coordination as v = rFω,
where rF is the radius of the front wheel.
It should be noted that many existing passivity-based methods cannot be
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directly applied in the (qm2, ω̇)-coordination since the pair (qm2, ω̇) implies position-
acceleration coordination. In this work, the proposed scheme for the (qm2, ω̇)-
coordination is inspired by the control algorithm for the (qm2, v)-coordination in [37].
A new variable rm2 = q̇m2 + λ1qm2 + λ2
∫ t
0
qm2(s)ds, λ1, λ2 > 0 is defined and trans-
mitted instead of transmitting qm2 as was accomplished in [37]. Then (qm2, ω̇)-
coordination can be approximately achieved by coupling rm2 with ω when the mag-
nitude of q̇m2 and q̈m2 are relatively small.
On the other hand, the (qm1, β)-coordination requires position-position coor-
dination. A PD-based control was applied in [37], but its controller gain is time
delay dependent as shown in equation (11) in [37]. In the current work, a control
scheme similar to the state synchronization scheme in Section 4.3.2 of [13] is pro-
posed for the (qm1, β)-coordination and the (rm2, ω)-coordination, thereby avoiding
delay dependent control gains.
Additionally, an adaptive control approach is utilized to address the uncertain-
ties in the system dynamics. Furthermore, the synchronization algorithms discussed
in [13, 61, 62] were developed under passivity assumptions on the human operator,
which not always be the case in practice as discussed in [71]. In the proposed
work, inspired by the scheme in [60], the passivity assumption is replaced with a
boundedness condition on the human and environment input. The proposed con-
trol framework is different from [60] in two main respects: (i) The formulation is
different. The scheme in [60] achieved the position tracking while the velocities are
driven to zero and it cannot be applied here to achieve the new control mode for









Figure 5.2: The single track model of the car-like robot: β is the steering
angle, θ is the angel between the world reference frame and the longitu-
dinal axis of the robot, a, b are the distance from center of mass to each
wheel.
system, while a tele-driving system is considered here.
As part of the BTDS study, a new tele-driving control framework is proposed in
this section. Compared with other related works, the contributions of the proposed
control scheme are summarized in Section 1.4. Next, the formulation of the proposed
tele-driving control scheme is described.
Based on Section 1.2.5, in the proposed tele-driving scheme in Fig. 5.1, the
dynamics for the local manipulator are given as
Mm(qm)q̈m + Cm(qm, q̇m)q̇m + gm(qm) = τm + fh (5.1)
where qm = [qm1, qm2]
T ∈ R2 represents the angular positions of the local robot,
Mm is the inertial matrix, Cm is the centrifugal and Coriolis matrix, gm is the
gravitational torque, τm is the local robot control input and fh is the human input.
The dynamics of the remote car-like mobile robot are approximated by a single-
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track model shown in Fig. 5.2. Following [72], the dynamics are given as
Ms(qs)η̇ + Cs(qs, q̇s)η = τs − fe (5.2)
where η = [β̇, ω]T ∈ R2, qs = [β, β̇]T ∈ R2, Ms is the inertial matrix, Cs is the
centrifugal and Coriolis matrix, τs is the remote robot control input and fe is the
environment input.
To simplify the car-like robot model in [72], the following assumptions are
made in this work:
• The robot moves on a horizontal plane without slip.
• Each wheel is modeled as a rigid wheel and the tire mechanics are not consid-
ered.
• Frictions is neglected in the model.
Following [72], the mathematical expression for each matrix of (5.2) is given
as
Ms =
 JF,v rFJF,v sin β/l
rFJF,v sin β/l m22
 ,
Cs =







2 β/l2 + JF,h + r
2
F [mF + cos




+ l2 + b(a+ l) cos 2β)mB + 2 sin
2 β(JF,v + JR,v)]/l
2
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c22 = sin 2β[(JB + JR,v + JF,v)r
2
R − (JR,h +mRr2R)l2 − (a+ l)bmBr2R]r2F β̇/2l2r2R
In the above equations, besides the notations introduced in Fig. 5.2, JB, JR,v,
JR,h, JF,v, JF,h are the moments of inertia of body, and the moments of inertia of
rear wheel and front wheel along vertical and horizontal wheel axis, respectively;
rF , rR are the radius of front and rear wheel, respectively; l := a+ b is the distance
between front and rear wheel; mB,mF ,mR are the mass of body, front wheel and
rear wheel, respectively.
Given the structure of Ms, Cs in (5.3) and the fact that the local joystick can
be modeled as a manipulator with two revolute joints as (5.1), it can be verified
that the properties (P1.2) and (P1.4) of Lagrangian dynamics also hold for the
dynamics of the local and remote robot.
The proposed adaptive coordination control framework consists of two steps:
(i) An adaptive control law is first used to render the local and remote robot
dynamics passive with respect to the new defined outputs;
(ii) Then a passive coordination control is applied to achieve the desired co-
ordination between the local and remote robot.





 q̇m1 + λqm1








 = Krs = K




where β is the steering angle, ω is the angular velocity of the front wheel as shown
in Fig. 5.1, and λ, λ1, λ2 > 0 are constant coefficients. It is natural to consider a
scaling factor between rm and rs due to the kinematic dissimilarity between the local
and remote robot. Hence, a constant diagonal positive definite scaling factor matrix
K is considered here. Consequently, in the ideal no delay case, the coordination
control would guarantee that Krs tracks rm, where K = diag([k1, k2]), k1, k2 > 0.
Assume there exists constant time delays Tmd and Tsd between the local and
remote robot in the network as shown in Fig. 5.1. Then, the coordination error
signals can be defined as
erm = rm − r̄s(t− Tsd), ers = r̄s − rm(t− Tmd) (5.6)
Definition 5.1.1. In this chapter, the coordination is said to be achieved by the
proposed tele-driving system if
lim
t→∞
(qm1(t− Tmd)− k1β) = lim
t→∞
(qm1 − k1β(t− Tsd)) = 0
lim
t→∞
(q̇m1(t− Tmd)− k1β̇) = lim
t→∞
(q̇m1 − k1β̇(t− Tsd)) = 0
lim
t→∞
(rm2(t− Tmd)− k2ω) = lim
t→∞
(rm2 − k2ω(t− Tsd)) = 0 (5.7)
Assuming that the dynamics parameters of the local and remote robots are
uncertain, their control inputs τm and τs are then designed as
τm = um − M̂m(
 λq̇m1
λ1q̇m2 + λ2qm2







− r̄s(t− Tsd)) + ĝm (5.8)
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where M̂i, Ĉi (i = m, s) and ĝm are the estimates of the model matrices, and um, us
are the coordination control inputs to be designed.
Using property (P1.4), the above control inputs can be rewritten as
τm = um + Ym(qm, q̇m, r̄s(t− Tsd), ˙̄rs(t− Tsd))φ̂m
= um + Ymφm + Ymφ̃m, (5.10)
τs = us + Ys(β, β̇, rm(t− Tmd), ṙm(t− Tmd))φ̂s
= us + Ysφs + Ysφ̃s (5.11)
where φ̂m, φ̂s are the time-varying estimates of the robots model parameters given by
φm, φs respectively and φ̃m := φ̂m−φm, φ̃s := φ̂s−φs are the parameters estimation
errors.
Then substituting (5.10) and (5.11) into (5.1) and (5.2) gives
Mmėrm + Cmerm = um + Ymφ̃m + fh (5.12)
M̄sėrs + C̄sers = us + Ysφ̃s − fe (5.13)
where M̄s = MsK
−1, C̄s = CsK
−1.
The update laws for the uncertain parameters estimates are given as
˙̂
φm = −Γ−1m Y Tm erm,
˙̂
φs = −Γ−1s Y Ts ers (5.14)
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where Γm and Γs are constant positive definite matrices.
We next establish passivity properties of the local and remote systems, in the
absence of external inputs fh and fe.
Lemma 5.1.1. Consider fh = 0 in (5.12), system (5.12) is passive with (um, erm)








Using the property (P1.2), the derivative of Sm along the trajectory of (5.12)
(5.14) is computed as
Ṡm = e
T
rm(−Cmerm + um + Ymφ̃m) +
1
2
eTrmṀmerm − φ̃TmY Tm erm = eTrmum
Following the definition of passivity from [13], the system (5.12) is passive with
(um, erm) as the input-output pair with respect to the storage function Sm.

Similarly, when fe = 0, system (5.13) is passive with (us, ers) as the input-







In this scheme, the coordination control um and us are designed as
um = −Kuerm, us = −Kuers (5.15)
where Ku is a constant diagonal positive definite control gain matrix.
Theorem 5.1.1. Consider the tele-driving system described by (5.1)-(5.15). Then,
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(a) if fh, fe ∈ L2 ∩ L∞, then the signal erm, ers, φ̃m, φ̃s are bounded and the
state coordination is achieved for the tele-driving system in the sense of Definition
5.1.1;
(b) if the tele-driven car is in hard contact with the environment assuming
steady state (q̇m, q̈m, β̇, β̈, ω, ω̇ → 0), then the driver can perceive the environment



























With the help of the property (P1.2), the derivative of V along the trajectories
of system (5.12), (5.13) and (5.14) can be computed as
V̇ = eTrm(−Cmerm + um + Ymφ̃m + fh) +
1
2
eTrmṀmerm − φ̃TmY Tm erm




˙̄Msers − φ̃Ts Y Ts ers





Substituting um, us in (5.15) into above equation gives
V̇ = −eTrmKuerm − eTrsKuers + eTrmfh − eTrsfe
≤ −λK |erm|2 − λK |ers|2 + |erm||fh|+ |ers||fe|
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where λK = λm(Ku) > 0.

















































Letting t→∞, and using the assumption that fh, fe ∈ L2, we have erm, ers ∈
L2 and V is bounded. Hence, from (5.16) the signals erm, ers, φ̃m, φ̃s are bounded.
From (5.12) and (5.13), and using the assumption that fh, fe ∈ L∞, ėrm, ėrs








(r̄s1(t− Tsd)− rm1) = lim
t→∞
(rm1(t− Tmd)− r̄s1) = 0 (5.17)
lim
t→∞
(r̄s2(t− Tsd)− rm2) = lim
t→∞
(rm2(t− Tmd)− r̄s2) = 0 (5.18)
Using (5.5), (5.18) is equivalent to
lim
t→∞
(rm2(t− Tmd)− k2ω) = lim
t→∞
(rm2 − k2ω(t− Tsd)) = 0 (5.19)
The signal r̄s1(t− Tsd)− rm1 can be rewritten as
r̄s1(t− Tsd)− rm1 = ėβ + λeβ (5.20)
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where eβ := k1β(t− Tsd)− qm1.
As (5.20) is an exponentially stable linear system with input r̄s1(t−Tsd)− rm1
and state eβ, by (5.17) and Theorem A.4 in [13], if r̄s1(t − Tsd) − rm1 ∈ L2 and





ėβ = 0 (5.21)
Similarly, if rm1(t− Tmd)− r̄s1 is rewritten as
rm1(t− Tmd)− r̄s1 = ėqm1 + λeqm1 (5.22)





ėqm1 = 0 (5.23)
Hence, the proof of the part (a) is complete.
(b) Now assuming q̇m, q̈m, β̇, β̈, ω, ω̇ → 0, then we have Cm(qm, q̇m) → 0 as
q̇m → 0 and ėrm → [0, λ2qm2]T in (5.12), thus














In (5.13), ˙̄rs → 0 and C̄s(qs, q̇s)→ 0 due to the structure of Cs in (5.3). Hence,





 −k1λβ + λqm1(t− Tmd)









For a signal x(t) and i = m, s, x(t) → x(t − Tid) as lim
t→∞
ẋ(t) = 0, thus when
q̇m, q̈m, β̇, β̈, ω, ω̇ → 0, fh →
Ku




















which completes the proof of the part (b).

Remark 5.1.1. Compared with the state synchronization control scheme for the
traditional bilateral teleoperation system in [13,61,62], the proposed scheme formu-
lates a passive system as (5.12) and (5.13) with the new defined outputs erm and
ers as (5.6). Additionally, the passivity assumption on the human and environment
in [13, 61, 62] can be avoided as has been accomplished in part (a) of Theorem
5.1.1. It should be noted that the bilateral teleoperation algorithms and results
developed in [13,61,62] can be made less conservative by avoiding the passivity as-
sumption on the human operator and environment, as has been done in the proposed
work.
Remark 5.1.2. From part (b) of Theorem 5.1.1, the force reflection from the
environment can be perceived by the human driver when the car is in hard contact
with the environment and in steady state. For example, when the car’s tire hits
an obstacle like the curb on the road, the environment force information can be
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provided to the local driver by (5.25), and hence the driver’s situational awareness
can be improved. In (5.25), the first and second row reflect the force feedback on
the steering direction and the forward driving direction, respectively. Observing the
final expression of (5.25), the effect of time delay on the force reflection is represented
by the second term, the effect of model parameters estimation errors on the force
reflection is represented by the third and fourth term, and the coupling between two
directions is represented by the last term.
5.2 Attack Design for Tele-driving System
The tele-driving system described in the previous section is also vulnerable to
content modification attacks discussed in Chapter 2. Given Definition 2.1.1, the
attacker is a malicious external entity which can launch content modification attack
by modifying the data content being exchanged by local and remote robot. Next
the MCoMA design for proposed tele-driving system based on Definition 2.2.1 is
presented. Here we consider two cases of MCoMA: (i) MCoMA on one side (remote
or local side); (ii) MCoMA on both sides. In the following designs, for simplicity, we
assume the there is no interaction between robot system and human/environment,
i.e., fh = fe = 0.
5.2.1 MCoMA on One Side
MCoMA on the remote side can be implemented as Fig. 5.3. The attacker is

















Figure 5.3: MCoMA on remote robot side.
and get access to rm(t− Tmd) and r̄s.
Proposition 5.2.1. Consider the proposed tele-driving system and the attacker is
co-located with the remote robot, a content modification attack that modifies the
received data for remote robot as
r̃m = rm(t− Tmd) + δs1rm(t− Tmd) + δs2r̄s, (5.26)









if (a) δs1 = −k − 1, δs2 = 1 + k, where k > 0 is a constant; (b) Vs 6= 0 at t = ta.
Proof:
For remote robot, we consider the storage function given in (5.27).
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Under the attack (5.26), the control input (5.15) for remote robot becomes
us = −Ku(r̄s − r̃m) (5.28)
= −Ku((1− δs2)r̄s − (1 + δs1)rm(t− Tmd))
Thus the derivative of Vs along the trajectory of (5.13) is
V̇s = −eTrsKu(r̄s − r̃m) = −eTrsKu((1− δs2)r̄s − (1 + δs1)rm(t− Tmd)) (5.29)
Now (a) δs1 = −k − 1, δs2 = 1 + k, k > 0 leads to
V̇s = ke
T
rsKuers > 0, ∀ers 6= 0, t ≥ ta (5.30)
Since (b) Vs 6= 0 at t = ta and V̇s ≥ 0 for t ≥ ta, φ̃s 6= 0 when ers = 0. Then
given (5.13), when ers = 0, the nonzero φ̃s can render ėrs 6= 0, which can drive ers
away from zero. Thus, V̇s stays positive and limt→∞ Vs =∞ for t ≥ ta, which proves
the proposed attack (5.26) is MCoMA for the remote robot with respect to Vs.

Following the similar approach, MCoMA attack can be designed on the local
side:
Proposition 5.2.2. Consider the proposed tele-driving system and the attacker
is co-located with the local robot, a content modification attack that modifies the
received data for local robot as


















Figure 5.4: Distributed MCoMA on both sides.









if (a) δm1 = −k − 1, δm2 = 1 + k, where k > 0 is a constant; (b) Vm 6= 0 at t = ta.
The proof is similar to proof of Proposition 5.2.1, thus it is omitted here.
5.2.2 MCoMA on Both Sides
MCoMA can be designed on both sides of the tele-driving system with re-
spect to the storage function V given in (5.16). As shown in Figure 5.4, there are
two non-colluding distributed attackers which reside on the local and remote side,
respectively.
Proposition 5.2.3. Consider the proposed tele-driving system and two non-colluding
distributed attackers which reside on each side, content modification attack that
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modifies the received data for local and remote robot as
r̃m = rm(t− Tmd) + δs1rm(t− Tmd) + δs2r̄s (5.33)
r̃s = r̄s(t− Tsd) + δm1r̄s(t− Tsd) + δm2rm,
where δs1, δs2, δm1, δm2 ∈ R are constant attack gain, is MCoMA with respect to
storage function given in (5.16) if (a) δm1 = δs1 = −k − 1, δm2 = δs2 = 1 + k, where
k > 0 is a constant; (b) V 6= 0 at t = ta.
The proof is also similar to proof of Proposition 5.2.1, thus it is omitted
here.
5.3 Attack Detection for Tele-driving System
In the previous section, the MCoMA design is discussed, which is a special
content modification attack. In more general cases, the attacker can stay anywhere
between the local and remote side, and can just launch a general content modification
attack defined as (2.1) and (2.2) to arbitrarily modify the data content. Here the
attack detection algorithm proposed in Section 2.3 is adopted to detect the general
content modification attack on the proposed tele-driving system.
Before proceeding, some notations need to be defined. The rm in (5.4) received
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by the remote vehicle can be written as
rm =
 q̇m1 + λqm1






 q̇m1 + λqm1





where α is a constant coefficient satisfying α + λ = λ1 and λα = λ2. Let us define





 q̇m1 + λqm1
Ṡ + λS
 = ṗm + λpm, pm := [qm1, S]T (5.35)
Also, ps is defined as ps := [β, ω]. As shown in Fig. 5.5, the physics-based
attack detection scheme with an encoding-decoding structure proposed in Section
2.3 can be implemented for BTDS by replacing the notation (żi, zi) in Section 2.3
with (ṗi, pi) here.
5.4 Simulation
In this section, the proposed tele-driving scheme, attack design and attack
detection scheme are simulated in Matlab.
5.4.1 Tele-driving Control Scheme
To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that the local robot dynamics pa-
rameters are known and the remote robot dynamics parameters are uncertain. The































































Figure 5.5: Physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-
decoding structure for BTDS.
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and hence the dynamics can be written as
Mmq̈m = τm + fh, qm ∈ R2 (5.36)
where Mm = diag([Jm1, Jm2]).







−K−1rm(t− Tmd)) = Ysφs,
(5.37)
and it can be verified that the parameters vector φs ∈ R7 and the regressor matrix
Ys(β, β̇, rm(t− Tmd), ṙm(t− Tmd)) ∈ R2×7.
The parameters in the control scheme are taken as following: λ = 3, λ1 =
2, λ2 = 2, k1 = 2, k2 = 3 and the control gain matrix Ku = diag([4, 10]). The
simulation parameters are taken as the following: simulation time t = 12s, time
step Tm = Ts = 0.005s, time delays Tsd = 0.1s, Tmd = 0.15s, the initial condition
for system states (qm1, qm2, q̇m1, q̇m2, β, β̇, ω) is (−0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0, 0), the nominal
value of φs in (5.37) is chosen as (1, 0.2, 4.04, 8.12, 1.24, 5.04,−0.5808). The human
input on the local robot fh = [fh1, fh2] is shown in the Fig. 5.6. In (5.8) and (5.9),
the derivative of r̄s(t − Tsd) and rm(t − Tmd) are computed and used, and in the
simulation, a low-pass filter is applied to r̄s(t − Tsd) and rm(t − Tmd) before the
derivatives are computed to get rid of the noise issue in the derivative computation.
In the simulation, the nominal value of φs is unknown, and a perturbation is added
on the nominal value of φs to generate an initial condition of φ̂s in the adaptation











Figure 5.6: The human input fh = [fh1, fh2] in the simulation.
The coordination performance of the proposed control scheme is shown in Fig.
5.7, and a zoomed-in plot of the simulation results for t ∈ [3s, 9s] is shown in Fig.
5.8. A good coordination performance under the human input is achieved with
communication delays and dynamic parametric uncertainties. In the fourth subplot
of Fig. 5.8, it is also verified that the new control mode (position-acceleration
(qm2, ω̇) coordination) is achieved by the proposed control scheme. Fig. 5.9 displays
the trajectories of the parameter vector φ̂s, and as demonstrated in part (a) of
Theorem 5.1.1, the parameter estimation errors remain bounded.
5.4.2 MCoMA Design
In this part, a MCoMA is designed on the remote robot side as Proposition
5.2.1. The simulation time t = 2s, k in Proposition 5.2.1 is set as 0.5, the attack
gains δs1 = −1− k = −1.5, δs2 = 1 + k = 1.5 and the rest of the parameters are the
same. The simulation result is shown in Fig. 5.10, and the storage function Vs keeps
increasing with non-negative increasing rate, which verifies the impact of MCoMA.
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Figure 5.7: The coordination performance of the proposed control scheme.
















Figure 5.8: The coordination performance for t ∈ [3s, 9s].
109




0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.4
0.45



















0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-1
-0.5
Figure 5.9: The trajectories of the parameters vector φ̂s for the remote robot.
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Figure 5.11: The attacker resides on the remote side.
5.4.3 Attack Detection on General Content Modification Attack
The detection scheme described in Section 5.3 is simulated for a general content
modification attack. The network time delays are set as Tmd = Tsd = 0.2s in this
case. In the encoding/decoding scheme, α = 1, λa = 2 and λb = 3 are chosen. Here
λa, λb are taken as constant, which is a special case for (2.4) and (2.5).
The attack is launched from t = 6s. As in Fig. 5.11, the attacker resides on










0.2[cos(5t); sin(5t)], r̂kssb = 0.2[sin(5t); cos(5t)], r̂
km
ma = 0.2[sin(4t); cos(4t)] and r̂
km
mb =
0.2[sin(4t); cos(4t)] for t ≥ 6s.
The checking error ei and its changing rate eid are shown in Fig. 5.12. The
threshold εi = 0.1 is shown as dashed red line in the figure. In the first two subplots,
the checking error exceeds the threshold εi after the attack is launched, which shows
the attack is detected. In the second subplot, we can observe that the sudden jump
of checking error is 0.2s delayed compared with first subplot, which reflects the
network delay. In the last two subplots, the sharp spikes at the attack time point
can be clearly observed, hence, the eid can actually be used as an additional attack
indication as discussed in Remark 2.3.1.
5.5 Tele-driving Experimental Platform Development
As part of the results, an initial tele-driving experimental platform is developed
as shown in Fig. 5.13. In this system, a human driver uses a local Logitech G920
racing wheel with pedals to tele-drive a remote car-like robot called Elre-Rover
developed by Elre Robotics. The human driver can send the control commands to
remote car and get the video feedback in real time, where the data is transmitted
through Wi-Fi using socket programming. The steering wheel SDK provided by
Logitech is used to query the wheel/pedals state, and the control commands for the
remote robot is implemented within ROS. This experimental platform can be used
for future research on tele-driving.
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Figure 5.12: Checking error ei and changing rate eid under a general





Human driver with steering wheel and pedals Remote car
Figure 5.13: The developed tele-driving experimental platform.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, a novel passivity-based adaptive coordination control scheme
is proposed for a new bilateral tele-driving system in the presence of communication
delays and dynamic parametric uncertainties. The proposed tele-driving scheme
can achieve a new control mode and haptic feedback to better emulate normal car
driving compared with the existing schemes in the mobile robot teleoperation such
as [37–40]. Unlike the synchronization control scheme in [13, 26, 62] for traditional
bilateral teleoperation system, the passivity assumption on the human and envi-
ronment is replaced with an appropriately defined boundedness condition. For the
proposed tele-driving system, the content modification attack design and detection
are studied. All the proposed schemes are verified through simulations. An initial
tele-driving experimental platform is also developed.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The results of this dissertation can be briefly summarized as follows: By uti-
lizing the physics of the robotic system, the content modification attacks are studied
on a fundamental problem called synchronization for networked robotic systems in-
cluding bilateral teleoperation system, multi-robot system and bilateral tele-driving
system.
• To demonstrate the potential severity of the attack, a systematic methodology
for designing destabilizing content modification attacks, termed as MCoMA,
is proposed. The proposed design framework utilizes the system’s physical
storage function for constructing the attack.
• To defend the system, a physics-based attack detection scheme with an encoding-
decoding structure is proposed to detect general content modification attacks.
The proposed scheme is fast-response, distributed, computationally light and
does not require the parameters of the system model. Additionally, the pro-
posed scheme is independent of network delays because the encoding and de-
coding factors are updated asynchronously, and it can work under the normal
network effects such as noises, packet drops and quantization errors with the
relaxation on the detection condition such as (2.16).
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• As part of the tele-driving system study, a novel passivity-based adaptive
bilateral tele-driving control scheme is proposed in the presence of network
delays and dynamic parametric uncertainties.
The proposed attack design and detection schemes for BTOS are verified on an
experimental platform, and the proposed schemes for MAS and BTDS are verified
through simulations.
This study explores the possibilities of utilizing the physics of the robotic sys-
tem to better understand and strengthen the security of the networked robotic sys-
tems, which provides a different perspective for the cyber-physical security problem
of CPS. Although the study is a meaningful exploration, the results do have some
limitations, for instance, (i) the determination of threshold constant εi in (2.16)
depends on the network conditions, which means the threshold might need to be
recalibrated under different network conditions; (ii) the initial values of encoding-
decoding factors in the proposed detection scheme have to be shared securely before
the operation, which imposes a constraint on the scheme.
The cyber-physical security of CPS is anticipated to becoming increasingly
important. The proposed work can be extended in several directions: (i) with
only attack detection schemes discussed in this work, the attack mitigation meth-
ods for content modification attacks can be further explored, which can maintain
the functioning of the networked robotic systems under attacks; (ii) the impact of
other edge attacks (such as intentional delay attack and packet dropping attack)
or node attacks on networked robotic systems can also be studied, and an attacker
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with a mixed attack strategies is also worth investigations; (iii) other physics-based
schemes are worth being further explored for CPS, which might provide a different
and even more effective way for securing CPS.
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